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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 and Utah
Constitution, Article VIII, section 3.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is an Agreement between the Utah Golf Association, Inc. (the

"UGA") and the City of North Salt Lake (the "City"), and the City of North Salt Lake,
Utah, Municipal Building Authority (the "Municipal Building Authority"1), ultra vires
and unenforceable where the City agreed to transfer public property without receiving in
exchange a present benefit that reflects fair market value of the property to be transferred?
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's
ruling on the issue. R. 423; R. 264-70.
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v.
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902 (Utah 1999); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2.

Is the Agreement between the UGA, the City, and the Municipal

Building Authority ultra vires and unenforceable because it purports to obligate the
Municipal Building Authority to convey real property to a third party, which it has no
authority to do under Utah's Municipal Building Authority Act?
1

The City and the Municipal Building Authority are referenced together as
the "City" for all purposes except for their arguments under the Utah Municipal Building
Authority Act.
1

This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's
ruling on the issue. R. 424, 564 at 11-12.
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v.
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902 (Utah 1999); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
3,

Did the City breach the alleged Agreement with the UGA because

the title to the property contained restrictions, but where the time for performance had not
arrived, and the defects on the City's title were remediable?
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's
ruling on this issue. R. 422, 424, 270-71.
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake County Comm yn v.
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902 (Utah 1999); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
4.

Should the district court have reconsidered its ruling that the City

breached its Agreement with the UGA where, before discovery closed or the district court
set a trial date on remaining issues, the City presented new, potentially dispositive legal
arguments regarding the alleged breach and the enforceability of the Agreement and new
material evidence regarding the alleged breach, and did the district court err in striking
the new evidence?

2

This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's
ruling on this issue. R. 421-425.
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
5.

Did the district court err in calculating benefit-of-the-bargain

damages by not deducting from the value of the property to be transferred to the UGA the
price the UGA was to pay and the costs avoided by the UGA by not having to perform?
This issue was raised at the bench trial on damages. R. 565 at 139-40.
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v.
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902 (Utah 1999); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
6.

If the City prevails on this appeal, should it be awarded attorney fees

and costs incurred on this appeal and in the district court?
Because the City did not prevail in the district court, this issue has not be
raised directly. The district court did conclude that the Agreement between the parties
did allow an award of attorney fees and costs to the UGA. R. 521, 549-50.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
determinative of issues in this appeal.
3

Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2(1):
(1) A board of commissioners or city council may:
(a) appropriate money for corporate purposes only;
(b) provide for payment of debts and expenses of the
corporation;
(c) purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, and
dispose of real and personal property for the benefit of the
city, whether the property is within or without the city's
corporate boundaries; and
(d) improve, protect, and do any other thing in relation
to this property than an individual would do.
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-903(l) and (2):
(1) The governing body of a public body may organize
a non-profit corporation as the building authority for the
public body under this part, following the procedures set out
in the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Cooperative
Association Act (Title 16, Chapter 6, Article 2), solely for the
purpose of accomplishing the public purposes for which the
public body exists by acquiring, improving, or extending one
or more projects and financing their costs on behalf of the
public body. The authority shall be known as the "Municipal
Building Authority of (name of public body)." The governing
body shall approve the articles of incorporation and bylaws of
the authority and shall act as the members of the board of
trustees of the authority. The articles of incorporation and
bylaws shall provide that members of the board of trustees of
the authority may be removed and replaced by the governing
authority any time in its discretion. The governing body may,
at its sole discretion and at any time, alter or change the
structure, organization, programs, or activities of the building
authority, subject to the rights of holders of the authority's
bonds and parties to its other obligations.
(2) Each building authority is authorized to acquire,
improve, or extend one or more projects and to finance their
costs on behalf of the public body that created it, in
4

accordance with the procedures and subject to the limitations
of this part, in order to accomplish the public purposes for
which the public body exists.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case centers around an Agreement between the City of North Salt Lake

(the "City") and the Utah Golf Association, Inc. (the "UGA"), in which the UGA agreed
to lease office space in the clubhouse of the City's proposed new golf course. In an
addendum to the Agreement, the Municipal Building Authority agreed to convey a certain
piece of property (the "UGA Property") to the UGA for free if the UGA built its
permanent headquarters on that property at the end of the original lease term. R. 27, 28
ffif B, F, 4; R. 32, 34ffl[C, I, 6. If the UGA elected not to construct its facilities on the
UGA Property, the UGA would instead get the proceeds of the sale of the UGA Property
if it agreed to a new long-term (20-year) lease of the office space. R. 28 ^f 5(a); R. 34 ^f
7(a). When the term of the original lease ended, the UGA did not construct its facilities
on the UGA Property, and it did not agree to a new long-term lease of the office space. In
December 1999, the City evicted the UGA. R. 162 Iflf 11-13.
On January 21, 2000, the UGA filed a Complaint against the City, alleging
breach of contract. The UGA alleged that a use restriction in the City's title to the UGA
Property, and the City's failure to immediately remove this defect constituted a breach of
the Agreement. R. 2-8fflf5-39. On May 4, 2000, the UGA filed a Motion for Partial
5

Summary Judgment on Liability, which the district court granted on July 14, 2000.
R. 222-23.
On January 17, 2001, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
Reconsideration, arguing that the district court had failed to consider controlling Utah law
in its ruling on liability. The City also presented new evidence that the use restriction on
the deed could have been lifted. The district court concluded that these issues should
have been raised previously, however, and denied the City's motion on May 15, 2001.
R. 421-25.
On May 30, 2001, the district court conducted a bench trial solely on the
issue of damages, and on July 19, 2001, the court issued its Memorandum Decision.
R. 440-47. The district court denied the UGA any damages related to its relocation, but
concluded that the UGA was nevertheless "entitled to the value of what it bargained for,"
and awarded the UGA $158,441 in damages. R. 446.
On October 10, 2001, the district court entered its Minute Entry Decision
and Order, as well as its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 520-23; 525-29.
Judgment was entered on November 13, 2001, R. 549-50, and on November 19, 2001, the
City filed its Notice of Appeal.

6

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Agreement.

On March 31, 1992, the City and the UGA entered into an Agreement
comprised of an "Office Use Agreement" ("Use Agreement") and a "First Addendum to
the Office Use Agreement" ("First Addendum"). In this Agreement, the City agreed to
construct, and the UGA agreed to lease for five years approximately 2,424 square feet of
office space, which was to be located in the Clubhouse of the City's Eaglewood Golf
Course. R. 11 f 2. The rent, or "user fee," for the office space was set at $30,300, R. 12
Tf 4, which the UGA admitted was considerably below the market rate for comparable
office space. R. 343fflj26-27 (stating that the UGA understood its user fee was at least
$3.00 per square foot below the fair market rate for comparable office space); R. 8 f 38
(stating that under another lease agreement with a different landlord, "the rent that will
need to be paid will greatly exceed the rent that was charged under the Office Use
Agreement with North Salt Lake").
To induce the UGA to enter into the Use Agreement, the First Addendum
also included several "freebies," such as an additional 888 square feet of free space for
the Utah Golf Hall of Fame, and the exclusive use of the golf course and golf carts for
two days each year of the Agreement and the right to retain all green fees collected on
those days. R. 27-28ffljC, D, 2. The UGA also received exclusive access to the driving

7

range for two hours per week, and the right to retain all fees charged during that period.
R. 27-28TCIF, 3.
The greatest inducement offered to the UGA, however, was the promise
that the Municipal Building Authority would convey the UGA Property to the UGA for
construction of its headquarters and a new Utah Golf Hall of Fame. R. 27-28fflfB, F, 4.
The Agreement stated:
If at any time after the fourth Agreement Year of this
Agreement User elects to construct its permanent
headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA
Property (collectively the "UGA Facility"), User shall deliver
to Building Authority written notice thereof (the
"Construction Notice"). The Construction Notice shall set
forth the proposed occupancy date of the UGA Facility and
shall be accompanied by a rendering and floor plan of the
proposed UGA Facility. Upon review and approval of the
final plans for the UGA Facility by the City of North Salt
Lake and its staff, Building Authority shall cause the UGA
Property to be conveyed, at no cost to User, by Special
Warranty Deed to User.
R. 28 H 4.
The Agreement alternatively provided that if the UGA elected not to build
on the UGA Property, the UGA could instead receive the proceeds from the sale of the
property. The UGA was entitled to receive the sale proceeds, however, "only upon the
following conditions: (a) User shall enter into a long-term (twenty years) use agreement
for the Premises with a provision for an annual three percent (3%) increase in the base
user fee for the extended term." R. 27, 28ffifF, 5(a). The Agreement also provided a
8

right of first refusal on the UGA Property to the Municipal Building Authority, and
reserved to the City the right to "approve the development and architectural plans of the
third party buyer with respect to the UGA Property." R. 28-29 Ifij 5(b), 5(c).
In January 1994, the City and the UGA amended their prior Agreement and
executed a "Second Addendum to the Office Use Agreement" ("Second Addendum"). In
the Second Addendum, the UGA agreed to lease approximately 2,178 square feet of
office space rather than the 2,424 originally contemplated, R. 31 ^ B, and the user fee was
changed to $25,000 to reflect the reduced square footage. R.32 ^j 1. The additional 888
square feet of free space for the Golf Hall of Fame was also reduced to 710 square feet,
R. 31 % E, and the UGA's right to retain the driving range fees collected during its
exclusive two hours per week was reduced to half. R. 32 f H. All of the other "freebies"
specified in the First Addendum were retained, however, including the provisions
regarding the UGA Property, and the UGA also received an additional 125 square feet of
free storage space and the right to retain half of the golf cart rental fees collected during
its two days of exclusive access to the golf course. R. 32fflfF, G.
The most significant change in the Second Addendum was an amendment
to the condition precedent regarding the UGA Property. As written in the Second
Addendum, should the UGA elect not to build its headquarters and Utah Golf Hall of
Fame on the UGA Property, it would be entitled to receive the proceeds of the sale of the
UGA Property only if it first "enter[ed] into a long-term (twenty years) use agreement for
9

the Premises upon such terms and conditions agreed upon between the parties on or
before the expiration of the original five (5) year Agreement Term." R. 34 f 7(a)
(emphasis added).
B.

Negotiations on a New Lease.

When the original lease term expired in January 1999, the UGA had not
elected to build its permanent headquarters on the UGA Property, nor had it entered into a
long-term lease with the City for the office space. R. 162 ^ 10-11. At that point, the
City allowed the UGA to continue to rent office space in the clubhouse on a month-tomonth basis, while attempting to reach an agreement with the UGA for a new long-term
lease. R. 162 ^f 12. Because the Agreement reserved a first right of refusal on the UGA
Property to the Municipal Building Authority, which the Municipal Building Authority
intended to exercise, the parties attempted to negotiate the value of the UGA Property
directly into the terms of the new long-term lease agreement. See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit
10 and 11, and Defendants' Trial Exhibit 18 (attached at the end of the Addendum).
On December 7, 1999, after months of unsuccessful negotiation, and after
nearly a year of a month-to-month tenancy, the City voted to end negotiations and evict
the UGA. R. 564 at 21; see R. 150-151. The next day, the UGA sent a letter offering
significantly higher lease terms than had previously been negotiated, which did not
include the value of the UGA Property. R. 564 at 22; R. 148. Before receiving this
December 8th letter, and without referencing it, the City terminated the month-to-month
10

lease with the UGA by proper written notice on December 9, 1999. R. 162 % 13;
R. 150-53.
C.

Ruling on the UGA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Liability

In its ruling on the UGA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Liability, the district court focused on the use restriction in the City's title to the UGA
Property, which required that the property be used only for an addition to the City's golf
course or as the UGA's headquarters. R. 222-223. Because the district court felt that this
restriction would essentially prevent the property from being sold to anyone other than
the City or the UGA, and the City was "unable to lift this restriction," it concluded that
the City had anticipatorily breached the agreement with the UGA. R. 223. The court
then explained that "an anticipatory breach will generally excuse the nonoccurrence of a
condition precedent," and found that the UGA's failure to agree to a new long-term lease
with the City was, therefore, excused. R. 223-24.
The district court then considered whether the UGA had at least shown
"readiness, willingness, and ability to have performed the conditions precedent." Because
the UGA had clearly decided not to build on the UGA Property, the district court focused
only on the condition precedent regarding the 20-year lease. The court concluded that the
20-year lease provision in the Second Addendum was an unenforceable "agreement to
agree," R. 224, so it turned instead to the 20-year lease provision in the First Addendum,
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and found that the UGA's December 8, 1999 letter "evidences the plaintiffs readiness
and willingness to enter into the required 20-year lease for more rent than required by the
First Addendum." R. 224. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the UGA would
have performed the condition precedent if the City had not first breached the Agreement,
and granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
D.

Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Reconsideration

In its Motion for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, which was filed
before the end of discovery and before a trial date had been set, see R. 253-55, 389-90,
the City argued that the district court had failed to consider controlling Utah law in its
prior summary judgment ruling. Specifically, the City argued that the Agreement
promising to convey the UGA Property was ultra vires and unenforceable because a
municipality is prohibited from transferring public property for less than a present benefit
that represents the fair market value of the property transferred. R. 264-67. At oral
argument, the City also argued that the Agreement was ultra vires and unenforceable
because it purported to obligate the Municipal Building Authority to convey the UGA
Property to the UGA, and under Utah law a municipal building authority is not authorized
to transfer public property to anyone other than the public body that created it. R. 564
at 11-12.

12

The City also argued that in prematurely finding an anticipatory breach, the
district court had failed to consider Utah law which clearly holds that a seller does not
need to have unencumbered title to the property until the time for conveyance arrives, and
any title defects discovered prior to that time will not constitute a breach unless they are
irremediable. R. 270-71. Relative to this issue, the City presented the affidavit of Mary
Wood Cannon, which stated that the developer was then, and was before, willing to
release the deed restriction if the City would have agreed to exercise its right of first
refusal on the property. R. 320-22. The UGA moved to strike the affidavit because Ms.
Cannon had not been identified by the City as a final witness and because this issue
should have been raised previously. R. 342. The UGA also argued that Ms. Cannon's
testimony was irrelevant to any material issue. R. 343. The district court agreed and
granted the UGA's Motion to Strike. R. 422.
The district court also denied the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Reconsideration, ruling that because the City had "ample opportunity" to respond to the
UGA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability, it should not now be heard to
raise any new arguments. R. 423-24 . The court wrote, "To the extent that a Motion for
Reconsideration exists at all, it does not exist for the purpose of raising new legal
arguments that were not raised in an original Motion." R. 424. The district court also
stated that even if it were appropriate to reconsider its grant of partial summary judgment,
it would not be persuaded by the City's new substantive arguments. R. 424.
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£.

Ruling on Damages

In its July 19, 2001 Memorandum Decision following the bench trial on
damages, the district court found that the Agreement included the implied promise that at
the end of the original five-year lease term, the UGA would "negotiate in good faith for a
more lengthy 20 year lease." R. 441. The court then reiterated that because "[t]he
problems with the deed restrictions on the lot could not be resolved," the UGA "refused
to enter into a long-term lease." R. 442.
Because the UGA could easily have agreed to a 20-year lease, however, and
resolved the issue of the UGA Property later, the district court denied the UGA any
consequential damages related to relocation following the Notice to Quit. R. 443-45.
The district court also determined that the UGA was "entitled to the value of what it
bargained for, that is, a lot that could be sold for its highest and best use," and therefore
awarded the UGA $158,441 for the value of the UGA Property (18,975 square feet at
$8.35 per square foot). R. 446. The court also awarded prejudgment interest as of the
effective date of the Notice to Quit, which was January 1, 2000. R. 446.
In the October 10, 2001 Minute Entry Decision and Order, the district court
ruled the UGA was entitled to attorney fees and costs for all matters relating to the issue
of liability as determined in the first summary judgment, fees in responding to the Motion
for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, and fees for preparation for trial, trial time,
and post-trial time related to the value of the property. R. 521.
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In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the district court found that
"North Salt Lake did not hold title to the subject lot that would make it marketable to
third parties because of use restrictions in the deed," R. 527 ^ 12, and that the City "did
not obtain release of the use restrictions on the lot." R. 528 Tf 14. The court also found
that the "UGA required North Salt Lake to be able to convey the lot free and clear from
the use restrictions before entering into a new lease," R. 528 ^ 16, and that "[b]ut for the
use restrictions on the lot, the parties would have successfully negotiated a 20-year lease."
R. 528 % 17. Based on these facts, the district court concluded that the City had
"breached the lease by not being able to convey unrestricted, fee title to the lot that could
be marketed to third parties." R. 529 If 1.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Based on well-established Utah law, it is clear that the district court erred in
finding the City liable for breach of contract and in awarding damages to the UGA. First,
in granting partial summary judgment to the UGA, the district court ignored the settled
rule that a vendor of real property is generally not required to have clear and marketable
title until the time for conveyance arrives, and that if the time for conveyance has not yet
arrived, any defect in the title is irrelevant and does not constitute a breach unless it is
irremediable.
Here, the time for conveyance had not arrived because the UGA had yet to
satisfy any of the conditions precedent outlined in the Agreement, and the district court
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made no finding that the defect on the title was irremediable. Instead, it simply found that
the use restriction had not been removed. By mistakenly focusing on whether the defect
had been cured, rather than whether the defect could be cured, the district court
prematurely and incorrectly concluded that the City had anticipatorily breached the
Agreement.
The district court also incorrectly construed the 20-year lease provision in
the Second Addendum as an unenforceable "agreement to agree" when it was actually a
valid condition precedent. Yet, even if the 20-year lease provision of the Second
Addendum could be ignored in favor of the 20-year lease provision of the First
Addendum, the UGA did not strictly comply with the terms of the First Addendum,
meaning that its rights to the proceeds from the sale of the UGA Property never matured.
Second, and even more important, the district court erred when it denied the
City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration. This motion was based on
controlling Utah law that goes to the very heart of the Agreement's enforceability. Utah
law prohibits a municipality from disposing of public property by gift without specific
legislative authority. To avoid being an illegal gift, transfers of public property must be
for adequate consideration, which this Court has defined as a present benefit that reflects
the fair market value of the property transferred. Here, the Agreement neither recited nor
provided consideration for the UGA Property, let alone consideration reflecting the fair
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market value of the property, and as a result, the proposed transfer was nothing more than
an illegal gift. Thus, the Agreement is ultra vires and unenforceable.
The Agreement is also ultra vires and unenforceable because Utah law does
not authorize municipal building authorities to transfer public property to anyone other
than the public body that created them. Here, because the Agreement identifies the
Municipal Building Authority as the title owner of the UGA Property and purports to
obligate it, according to the UGA, to convey that property to the UGA, the Agreement is
ultra vires and unenforceable.
These legal arguments, along with the new evidence that the use restriction
on the deed could have actually been removed, presented the matter in a new light, and a
manifest injustice resulted when the district court refused to reconsider its prior ruling.
The City asked for reconsideration before the end of discovery and before a trial date had
been set. When the district court refused to consider this controlling Utah law and instead
awarded damages to the UGA, it improperly gave effect to an unenforceable agreement.
Finally, at the very least, the district court erred in awarding the UGA
damages reflecting the full value of the UGA Property, without subtracting the costs the
UGA would have incurred had the Agreement not been breached—the payments that
would have been made under a new long-term lease. The damages award is, therefore,
contrary to the benefit-of-the-bargain damages measure, and is disproportionately harsh
and unreasonable. For all of these reasons, the decision of the district court should be
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reversed. The City should also be awarded attorney fees and costs on this appeal and in
the district court if it prevails.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY AND THE UGA IS
ULTRA VIRES AND NOT ENFORCEABLE.
A.

The Agreement Lacks The Required Consideration And Is
Therefore Not Enforceable
1.

Actions to Give Awav Public Property are Ultra Vires in
Utah.

This Court has long held that because a municipality holds its property "in
trust for the use and benefit of its inhabitants/' municipal property "cannot be disposed of
by gift without specific legislative authority." Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118, 119
(Utah 1975). To avoid being an illegal gift, a transfer of municipal property must be
made "in good faith and for an adequate consideration." Id. "Adequate consideration"
must be "present benefit that reflects the fair market value" of the property transferred,
and as such, the consideration cannot be speculative nor provide a future benefit.
Municipal Bldg. Autk v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1985). The Court must be
able to specify "exactly what [the] benefit is, in present market value terms," and a
"general finding" of some benefit is not sufficient. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. Salt
Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 910 (Utah 1999).
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In Sears, Ogden City wanted to vacate a street that divided the Ogden High
School campus and give the land to the Board of Education of Ogden City. Despite the
intended public purpose of the transfer, this Court held that the proposed conveyance was
improper because Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2, which allows a city to "dispose" of its
property, does not allow disposal by gift but only for "adequate consideration." Sears,
533 P.2d at 119. The substance of that statute has not changed since Sears was decided.
In Lowder, Iron County wanted to transfer an old jail and site to its own
county municipal building authority for a nominal sum. Even though the agreement
resulted in a new jail for the county and provided that the property would revert to the
county in 20 years, and even though the agreement was between the county and its own
municipal building authority, this Court disallowed the transfer because the county would
not receive "present benefit that reflects the fair market value" of the property transferred.
Lowder, 111 P.2d at 282. This Court concluded that the benefit Iron County received
under its agreement was "a speculative and future benefit that cannot suffice to validate a
present transfer of the fee." Id.
In Salt Lake County Comm % this Court ruled that contributions to certain
charities by Salt Lake County were illegal because the contributions "were not tied to any
specific services to be rendered," and the county failed to provide a "detailed showing of
the benefits to be obtained from the money given." Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 985 P.2d
at 910.
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It is critical that the Court see from these cases that the kind of
consideration required for the transfer of public property is not the typical "bargained for
exchange" that is required in contracts generally. Cf Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 71 and comment c (stating that consideration can be a mixture of bargain and gift, and
courts generally will not scrutinize the gift part). Unlike consideration in general, the
consideration this Court has required for the transfer of public property must be real and
substantial; it must be nothing less than a "present benefit that reflects fair market value."
Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282. There is no such consideration here.
2.

The Agreement of the Parties Provided No Consideration for
the Conveyance of the UGA Property.
a.

The express terms of the Agreement do not provide
any consideration for the transfer of the UGA Property.

Neither the First Addendum nor Second Addendum recites any
consideration for the UGA Property. Instead, both simply state that if the UGA elects to
build its headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA Property, the
"Building Authority shall cause the UGA Property to be conveyed, at no cost to User, by
Special Warranty deed to User." R. 27 ^J 4 (emphasis added); R. 32 % 6 (emphasis added).
Should the UGA elect not to construct its new facilities on the UGA property, the UGA
was entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the UGA Property, as long as it first entered
into a "long-term (twenty years) use agreement for the Premises" with the City. R. 28
Tf 5(a); R. 34 ^ 7(a). In reality, the promise to convey the UGA Property was offered
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simply "[a]s a further inducement for User (UGA) to enter into a use agreement" with the
City, but the UGA did not promise to give present benefit that reflected fair market value
of the property. R.271JF; R . 3 2 ^ I .
This is not consideration of the type required by Sears, Lowder, and Salt
Lake County Comm 'n. Therefore, the Agreement is outside the scope of the City's
powers, and it is ultra vires and unenforceable. See McQuillan, The Law of Municipal
Corporations § 29.91 (3d ed. 1999) ("To be valid and enforceable,... the contract must
be within the scope of the municipal powers, i.e., it must not be ultra vires . . . . " ) ; John
W. Smith, The Modern Municipal Law of Corporations § 628 (1903) ("Acts of municipal
corporations which are done without power expressly granted, or fairly to be implied
from the powers granted or incident to the purposes of their creation, are ultra vires.").
b.

The rental paid by the UGA for the office space was
not consideration for the UGA Property.

The fact that the UGA accepted the inducement, entered into the Use
Agreement with the City, and paid rent for the office space for six years does not make
that part of the Agreement dealing with the UGA Property valid because the payments
made by the UGA represented the lease value of the office space and bore no relationship
to the value of the UGA Property. Indeed, the UGA's payments under the Agreement do
not even represent the fair market value of the office space leased.
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Under the Second Addendum, the UGA leased the office space for $25,000
per year, for six years (the five-year original term, plus one year of month-to-month
tenancy), for about $150,000 total in user fees. The UGA admitted that this amount was
below the fair market rate for the lease of comparable office space. R. 343fflf26-27
(stating that the UGA understood its user fee was at least $3.00 per square foot below the
fair market rate for comparable office space); R. 8 ^f 38 (stating that under another lease
agreement with a different landlord, "the rent that will need to be paid will greatly exceed
the rent that was charged under the Office Use Agreement with North Salt Lake").
The UGA also received from the City, however, $33,192 in green fees and
golf cart rentals over the life of the Use Agreement. R. 313. This means that the UGA
actually paid only about $117,000 for office space worth more than $150,000. (The total
amount paid by the UGA is also well below the fair market value of the UGA property,
which the UGA estimated at $ 190,000, R. 262-63 % 25; R. 310-311; and the district court
valued at $158, 441. R. 446.) Because the payments made by the UGA under the Use
Agreement did not even cover the value of the office space, they cannot be construed as
the consideration for the UGA Property of the type required by Sears, Lowder, and Salt
Lake County Comm yn.
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c.

The 20-year lease condition precedent also could not
be consideration for the transfer of the UGA Property.

The 20-year lease condition precedent to obtaining the proceeds from the
UGA Property also would not have been a "present benefit that reflects the fair market
value" of the UGA Property and, therefore, is not consideration for the transfer of the
UGA Property. As with the original Use Agreement, any payments the UGA would have
made under a 20-year lease would have represented the value of the office space in the
clubhouse over 20 years and would not have included the value of the UGA Property.
The district court implicitly confirmed this when, while awarding damages
to the UGA for its lost benefit of the bargain, the court did not deduct the amount of lease
payments the UGA would have made under a 20-year lease from the value of the UGA
Property. R. 446. An essential step in calculating benefit-of-the-bargain damages is to
deduct from the value the non-breaching party would have received from performance of
the contract the costs that party would have incurred in performing the contract. See
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 150-151 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Restatement (Second)
of Contract § 347 (expectation interest damages must be reduced by "any cost or other
loss . . . avoided by not having to perform"). In fact, the district court deducted nothing
from what it found to be the value of the UGA Property, R. 446, thereby recognizing the
Agreement provided no consideration for the proceeds of the sale of that property.2
2

The City also presented undisputed evidence that payments made under a
20-year lease would not have included any value in addition to just paying for the office
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By all appearances, the UGA property was just a gift thrown into the
Agreement—like the free Hall of Fame space and green fees—to induce the UGA to
maintain its offices at the clubhouse. Because the City is prohibited under Utah law from
giving away its property for less than a "present benefit that reflects fair market value,"
and because the Agreement lacks this required consideration, the Agreement regarding
the UGA Property is ultra vires and cannot be enforced. See Emmett Clinton Yokley,
Municipal Corporations § 438 (1958) (stating that "an ultra vires contract is no contract at
all"). As a result, the UGA is not entitled to the benefit of this unenforceable bargain.
The ruling of the district court should be reversed.

space. If the First Addendum provision were used, as the district court ruled, R.224, the
user fee for the 20-year use agreement would have been three percent above the $25,000
base fee paid under the Second Addendum, or $25,750 for the first year, with the amount
going up three percent annually. R. 28. Assuming the 20-year use agreement had been
executed at $25,750 per year for 2,178 square feet, that would be $11.82 per square feet.
When the free Utah Golf Hall of Fame space is factored in along with an average of
$5,532 per year in green fees and golf cart rentals the UGA received over the course of
the Use Agreement, the effective rental rate would have been a mere $7.01 per square
foot for the first year. R. 313. Since the UGA vacated the clubhouse at the end of 1999,
the City has leased approximately 1,450 square feet of the space originally occupied by
the UGA for an average of $12.17 per square foot, and these renters are not allowed
exclusive use of the golf course or the retention of any green fees or golf cart rentals.
R. 330; R. 343 \ 26 (stating that the UGA believes $14.50 per square foot is the fair
market rate of the office space). Thus, it is obvious that the amount the UGA would have
paid under a 20-year use agreement would have been well below fair market value;
therefore, the 20-year lease could not have been consideration for the transfer of the UGA
property.
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B,

The Agreement Is Also Ultra Vires and Unenforceable Because
the Municipal Building Authority Has No Authority to Convey
Title to the UGA.

The Agreement is also ultra vires and unenforceable because the Municipal
Building Authority has no authority to convey title of the UGA property to the UGA.
Under Utah's Municipal Building Authority Act, municipal building authorities may be
organized "solely for the purpose of accomplishing the public purposes for which the
public body exists by acquiring, improving, or extending one or more projects and
financing their costs on behalf of the public body." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-903(l).
Municipal building authorities are therefore authorized to "acquire, improve, or extend
one or more projects and to finance their costs on behalf of the public body that created
[them]." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-903(2). They are not empowered under the Act,
however, to dispose of property to anyone other than the public body that created them.
Despite the clear limitations placed on municipal building authorities under
the Act, the Agreement recites that the "Building Authority is the fee title owner of a
certain parcel of real property (4the UGA Property')," and that "[a]s a further inducement
for User to enter into a use agreement, Building Authority agrees to convey to User the
UGA Property." R. 27ffifB, F (emphasis added); R. 32fflfC, I (emphasis added).
Because the Agreement here purports to obligate the Municipal Building Authority to do
something which it has no authority to do—to convey the property to the UGA—the
Agreement is ultra vires on its face and is therefore unenforceable. See McQuillan, The
25

Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.91 (3d ed. 1999); John W. Smith, The Modern
Municipal Law of Corporations § 628 (1903); see also Emmett Clinton Yokley,
Municipal Corporations § 438 (1958) (stating that "an ultra vires contract is no contract at
all"). Without an enforceable agreement, the City can have no liability, and the UGA can
recover no damages. The ruling of the district court should be reversed.
C.

The UGA Is Bound By the City's Lack Of Authority To Enter
Into the Agreement And Is Chargeable With Knowledge Of
These Limitations.

The district court's conclusion that the UGA was entitled to its expectation
interest, or the foil value of the UGA Property, is directly contrary to the rule that
[t]he municipal corporation cannot in any manner bind itself
by any contract which is beyond the scope of its powers, or
foreign to the purposes for which it was created, or which is
forbidden by law, or against public policy; all persons
contracting with the corporation are deemed to know its
limitations in these respects.
McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999).
If the City cannot be bound by an ultra vires agreement that is beyond the
scope of its powers, the UGA cannot be entitled to any damages based on that agreement.
The Agreement here was ultra vires in at least two respects, as discussed above, and by
awarding damages to the UGA reflecting the value of the UGA Property, the district court
actually gave effect to an unenforceable Agreement and improperly accomplished "by
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indirection that which [the] municipality is not permitted to do directly." McQuillan, The
Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.111.10 (3d ed. 1999).
In oral arguments on this issue, the district court expressed concern about
the fairness of leaving the UGA without a remedy for the City's alleged breach. The
court asked, "So if you deal with some governmental agency that claims to have authority
and agrees to do things that it cannot legally do, you do so at your own risk?" R. 564
at 12. When counsel responded, "I think to some extent you do, your Honor," the Court
remarked, "Why does that strike me as inordinately unfair?" R. 564 at 12.
The district court's concerns, though understandable, were misplaced
because "[t]he general rule is well settled and enforced that one who makes a contract
with a municipal corporation is bound to take notice of limitations on its power to
contract and also of the power of the particular officer or agency to make the contract."
McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999); id. § 39.37 ("One
who deals with a municipality is bound by the limitations on its powers, and is chargeable
with knowledge of these limitations."); see Emmett Clinton Yokley, Municipal
Corporations § 436 (1958); John W. Smith, The Modern Municipal Law of Corporations
§§662,664(1903).
This Court has accepted and applied this general rule. See, e.g. Municipal
Building Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 279 (Utah 1985) (citing McQuillan, The Law of
Municipal Corporations § 29.04); Thatcher Chemical Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 21
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Utah 2d 355, 358, 445 P.2d 769, 771 (Utah 1968) (citing McQuillan, The Law of
Municipal Corporations § 29.28). This Court has gone so far as to say that "[o]ne who
deals with a municipal corporation does so at his peril." Thatcher Chemical Co., 21 Utah
2d at 358, 445 P.2d at 771; see also McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations
§ 29.04 (3d ed. 1999) ("When a municipality goes beyond the law, the person who deals
with it in so doing does so at his or her own risk.").
Here, the UGA knowingly negotiated a very favorable deal with the City
containing several "freebies," and under Utah law, it is charged with the knowledge that
the Agreement was outside the authority granted to the City. Although the district court
may have thought this result unfair and believed it could provide a remedy, the law is
clear as to who bears the burden when a municipality makes an ultra vires agreement.
Moreover, "[a] contrary doctrine would be fraught with danger. It is better that the
innocent contracting party suffer from the municipality's mistakes than to adopt rules,
which, through improper combination or collusion, could be detrimental or injurious to
the public." McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999).
While the law is that the UGA had to deal with the City at its own risk, the
City notes that if the Court agrees and invalidates that portion of the Agreement regarding
the UGA Property, the UGA is not harmed in the least. As discussed above, the UGA
paid approximately $117,000 over six years for office space that was worth more than
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$150,000. Thus, the UGA got exactly what it paid for and more. It just also wants to
reap the windfall benefits of an illegal agreement.
Both public policy and Utah law require that the UGA bears the risk of
making an ultra vires agreement with the City. As a result, the City cannot be bound by
the Agreement and the UGA is not entitled to any damages that would in effect enforce
an unenforceable agreement.
II.

EVEN IF THE AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE, THE CITY
DID NOT BREACH ANY PROVISIONS.
A.

The City Did Not Actually or Anticipatorily Breach The
Agreement Because Any Defects on the Title of the UGA
Property Were Irrelevant.

Although the district court concluded that the City breached the Agreement
by not holding clear and marketable title to the UGA Property, R. 222-23, this conclusion
is wrong. Under the clear terms of the Agreement, the UGA was entitled to conveyance
of the title to the UGA Property only if it first elected to construct its headquarters and the
Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the property and had its plans approved by the City. R. 34
U 6. Because the UGA had decided not to build on the UGA property, it was instead
entitled only to the proceeds from the sale of the property (and then only if it first agreed
to a 20-year lease). R. 34 ^ 7(a). Thus, any defects on the title of the UGA Property were
irrelevant.
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This is especially true because the Municipal Building Authority, the entity
that according to the Agreement held title to the UGA Property, had a right of first refusal
on any sale of the UGA Property, and it planned to exercise that right. As a result,
because a third party would not end up with the property, the parties attempted to
negotiate the value of the UGA Property into the terms of the 20-year lease agreement.3
See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 10 and 11 and Defendants' Trial Exhibit 18 (attached at end
of Addendum). Because the UGA was only entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the
UGA Property and the Municipal Building Authority planned to keep the property, either
the value could have been taken into account in the 20-year lease or, as the district court
found when calculating damages, the UGA could have signed a 20-year lease and gone to
court over the value of the UGA Property. R. 443-44. The bottom line, however, is that
the defects on the title were irrelevant.

3

Such an agreement would have avoided the practical limitations of the
Municipal Building Authority's powers, as well as made the defect on the title irrelevant,
while at the same time providing the UGA with all it was entitled to under the
Agreement. The value of the property was determined by an appraiser prior to the
commencement of negotiations, and could have been factored into the parties' dealings if
the UGA would have negotiated in good faith. (The appraisal, dated September 3, 1998,
was admitted as Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 16, but it is not reproduced in the Addendum
because of its size.) Moreover, because the City planned to use the property for golf
course purposes, which was allowed by the use restriction, the defects on the title were
further irrelevant.
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B.

The City Also Did Not Actually or Anticipatorily Breach the
Agreement Because Its Performance was Not Yet Due and Any
Defects On the Title Were Not Irremediable.

When the district court concluded that the City had anticipatorily breached
the Agreement by not holding clear and marketable title, the court missed the point that
the UGA was only entitled to proceeds, not title. Yet, assuming the UGA was entitled to
title, the district court also failed to consider the well-established rule that a seller is
allowed reasonable time to perfect title. See Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d
716, 724 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Callister v. Millstream Assocs. Inc., 738 P.2d 662,
664 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Generally, this means that a seller is not required to have
full and clear marketable title until the time for conveyance has arrived. Corporation
Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 53, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1973); Marlowe Inv. Corp. v.
Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 126, 485 P.2d 1402, 1404 (Utah 1971); Leavitt v. Blohm, 11
Utah 2d 220, 222, 357 P.2d 190, 192-93 (Utah 1960); Owens v. Neymeyer, 62 Utah 80,
221 P. 160, 162-163 (1923). In fact, a seller can make a valid contract to sell real property
to which he has no legal title at all, as long as the seller has title when the time comes to
convey. Neves v. Wright, 638P.2d 1195, 1197, 1199 n.l (Utah \9U)\ see Foxley v. Rich,
99 P. 666, 669-70 (Utah 1909) (stating that the seller can even transfer title to a third
party during the executory period of the contract).
If the time for conveyance has not yet arrived, any defect in the title is
irrelevant and does not constitute a breach unless it plainly appears that the seller has lost
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or so encumbered the title that he will be unable to perform when the time arrives.
Marlowe Inv. Corp., 26 Utah 2d at 127, 485 P.2d at 1404. The test is whether the defect
in the title by its nature is one that can, as a practical matter, be removed. Neves, 628
P.2d at 1199. The buyer should not be heard to complain unless it appears that it will be
impossible for the seller to perform his duties under the contract when he is called upon to
do so. Corporation Nine, 30 Utah 2d at 53-54, 513 P.2d at 421.
This rule is meant to provide the necessary flexibility in real estate
transactions, Neves, 638 P.2d at 1198, but here the district court took away all flexibility
by prematurely and improperly finding an anticipatory repudiation.
Under well-established principles of contract interpretation,
where the duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon
the occurrence or existence of a condition precedent, the
obligee may not require performance by the obligor, because
the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right to
demand performance, does not arise until that condition
occurs or exists.
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah 1999) (citing 3A
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 628, at 16 (I960)); Commercial Union Assocs. v.
Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation omitted) (stating that "[a]
condition precedent is one which must be performed by the one party to an existing
contract before the other party is obligated" and "[c]ourts must respect express conditions
precedent").
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Here, the time for conveyance had not yet arrived because neither of the
conditions precedent had been satisfied. The UGA had elected not to build its
headquarters and Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA Property, and it had failed to agree
to continue leasing the office space under a new 20-year lease with the City. As a result,
the City was under no obligation to perfect the title or otherwise perform under the
Agreement, and the UGA had no right to demand such performance. See Harper, 976
P.2d at 1217 (citing 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 630) ("Failure of a
material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform."). Any defect
on the title was, therefore, irrelevant and could not possibly constitute a breach of the
Agreement.
There also was no anticipatory breach of the Agreement because the district
court made no finding that the City's ultimate performance was impossible or even
improbable. The district court simply found that the City did not—not could not—perfect
the title. R. 222-23; R. 528 ^f 14. But since the time to convey had not arrived, whether
the City had in fact perfected the title was irrelevant. The only issue properly before the
district court was whether the City could ultimately perfect the title when the time for
conveyance arrived.
In fact, the use restriction complained of by the UGA could have been
removed by the City when the time came for conveyance. R. 321 Tf 6. When the City
presented an affidavit to this effect on its Motion for Summary Judgment and
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Reconsideration, however, the district court granted the UGA's Motion to Strike and
refused to consider this crucial and material evidence.4 R. 321 ^j 6; R. 422.
In the end, the key issue in determining whether there has been an
anticipatory breach of a real estate agreement is whether it is beyond the power of the
seller to comply with the terms of his own contract. Foxley v. Rich, 99 P. 666, 669-70
(Utah 1909). Here, the City had the power to comply with the terms of its Agreement
with UGA, and it would have fully performed when the time for performance arrived.
The City was never given that chance. The ruling of the district court, therefore, should
be reversed.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING THAT THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT IN THE SECOND ADDENDUM WAS AN
UNENFORCEABLE "AGREEMENT TO AGREE" WAS
UNNECESSARY AND WRONG.
Because the district court improperly concluded that the City had

anticipatorily breached the Agreement by not immediately perfecting the title to the UGA
Property, it excused the UGA's actual performance of any of the condition precedents.
4

As with the legal arguments presented in the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Reconsideration, this new evidence was improperly excluded by the district
court. See infra Part V. When a party offers new evidence, in particular new evidence
that goes to a material issue or presents the matter in a "different light" or under "different
circumstances," a motion to reconsider should be granted. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, despite the UGA's bald
assertion that the affidavit was immaterial, the fact that the use restriction could have
been removed, and that the City could have in fact perfected title when the time for
performance arrived, went to a material issue at the very heart of the case. This evidence
should have been considered by the district court.
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The district court looked next to whether the UGA had at least been "ready and willing"
to perform a condition precedent. Because the UGA had clearly elected not to build its
headquarters or the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA Property, the district court
considered only the issue of whether the UGA would have entered into a 20-year lease
agreement with the City. R. 224.
At that point, the district court concluded that it could not determine
whether the UGA had been ready and willing to perform this condition precedent
contained in the Second Addendum, which required a 20-year lease upon such terms and
conditions as agreed upon by the parties, because it found that this provision was an
unenforceable "agreement to agree." The district court then turned to the First
Addendum and found that the UGA's December 8, 1999 letter showed that it had been
ready and willing to perform under those terms.5 R. 224.
The district court's legal conclusion that the condition precedent in the
Second Addendum was an unenforceable '"agreement to agree" is wrong. Although Utah
law does hold that indefinite options to renew in lease agreements are not enforceable, see
5

Such legal gymnastics were wholly unnecessary, however, and resulted
from the district court putting the proverbial cart before the horse. As discussed at length
above, had the district court properly considered and applied Utah law regarding title
defects and when they need to be cleared, it would have been required to simply ask
whether the condition precedent had been satisfied to determine whether the time for
performance had arisen, which it had not. By finding that the very thing that would have
triggered performance and the need to have clear and marketable title—the condition
precedent—was excused because the City did not have clear and marketable title was
backward reasoning.
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Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988); Brown's Shoe Fit v. Olch,
955 P.2d 357, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), it was wrong for the district court to construe the
20-year lease provision in the Second Addendum as a covenant promising an option to
renew. Instead, this provision was a condition precedent in an agreement to convey real
property, and conditions precedent are entirely different from covenants. While
covenants determine what must be performed to discharge duties, conditions simply
determine when and if the duties defined in the covenants must be performed. In other
words, "[a] condition precedent is a fact or event which the parties intend must exist or
take place before there is a right to performance.... A condition is distinguished from a
promise in that it creates no right or duty in and of itself but is merely a limiting or
modifying factor...." Lack v. Cahill, 85 A.2d 481 (Conn. 1951).
Because of their unique nature, conditions precedent are not required to be
explicitly based on wholly objective criteria or be enforceable agreements in their own
right. In fact, a condition precedent may be based solely on one's own personal
satisfaction with the quality of the performance for which he has bargained. 3 A Arthur L.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 644 at 78-79 (1960). Courts around the country have
upheld conditions precedent based on personal satisfaction, even in cases involving the
sale of real property. See, e.g. Mattel v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958) (where
plaintiff real estate developer contracted to buy real property for a shopping center subject
to defendant obtaining leases satisfactory to the purchaser); Western Hills, Oregon, Ltd. v.
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Pfau, 508 P.2d 201 (Or. 1973) (where purchaser of real property was to obtain necessary
permits for a development satisfactory to the parties); Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle First
Nat'I Bank, 645 P.2d 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (where plaintiff purchaser contracted for
purchase of real estate, subject to purchaser's receipt of satisfactory feasibility report).
Public policy further supports the view that the 20-year lease provision in
the Second Addendum was a valid condition precedent and was not an unenforceable
"agreement to agree." Courts refuse to enforce covenants with indefinite options to
renew because courts are not equipped to make monetary decisions impacted by the
fluctuating commercial world and are even less prepared to impose paternalistic
agreements on litigants. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1989).
Because this was simply a condition precedent, however, none of these concerns is at
issue. Here, the district court was not required to specifically enforce the Agreement or
otherwise fashion a lease agreement for the parties. Instead, the district court simply
needed to look to see if an extended lease agreement had been made (on any terms) and if
the condition precedent had thus been satisfied.6
6

Even if the condition precedent here is treated as a straight lease option, a
minority line of cases would still uphold the language in the Second Addendum. Under
this rule, a lease option with undetermined terms is nevertheless enforceable because the
court implies a mutual agreement for a reasonable rental which prevents the promise from
being illusory. See Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321
(Utah 1976) (discussing the minority line of cases). Here, the district court found an
implied covenant to negotiate in good faith, R. 441, which would make the option
enforceable under this analysis.
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Fairness also supports the conclusion that the condition in the Second
Addendum in this case is valid. If the district court's award of damages is affirmed, the
UGA will have paid the City $117,000 for six years' use of office space valued at over
$150,000, but the City will be required to pay the UGA over $158,000 in damages,
meaning the UGA made money on the deal. Had the 20-year lease agreement been
enforced as a condition precedent to the City's obligations regarding the UGA Property,
at least the UGA would have been paying the City over $25,000 per year for 20 years.
In sum, the condition precedent contained in the Second Addendum was
valid and was not satisfied. Therefore, the City's duty regarding the UGA Property under
the Agreement never arose, and the UGA is not entitled to any damages. The ruling of
the district court should be reversed.
IV.

EVEN WERE THE CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE SECOND
ADDENDUM NOT VALID, THE UGA ALSO FAILED TO SATISFY
THE CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE FIRST ADDENDUM.
Even were the condition precedent in the Second Addendum not valid, the

UGA is still not entitled to any damages because it never satisfied the condition precedent
outlined in the First Addendum. The First Addendum required that before the expiration
of the original lease term, the UGA must agree to a 20-year lease extension with a three
percent annual increase from the base fee. R. 28 ^ 5(a). But, the UGA did not make an
offer meeting these terms until December 8, 1999, almost a full year after the original
term of the lease had expired, and the day after the City had voted to discontinue
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negotiations and prepare an eviction notice. R. 148; R. 150-51. The UGA was clearly
not "ready and willing" to perform under the terms of the First Addendum at the end of
the original lease term, and it is not entitled to any damages. At the very least, an issue of
fact exists on this point that would preclude summary judgment.
If this provision from the First Addendum is considered to be an option to
extend as the district court apparently believed it was, given its ruling on the Second
Addendum, Utah law is clear that option provisions must be strictly complied with and
that notice of an intent to extend must be given before the end of the original lease term.
Professors Thomas and Backman have summarized Utah law on this issue as follows:
An option to renew or extend a lease must be
exercised before the expiration of the lease unless otherwise
provided. If the lease does not specify how the option is to be
exercised, it must be done in a manner that indicates to the
lessor an unconditional and unqualified determination to
exercise the option.
D. Thomas & J. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law, § 5.01(f)
at 188 (Lexis 1999) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). This Court has also written that
"[w]hen the optionee decides to exercise his option he must act unconditionally and
precisely according to the terms of the option." Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble
Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1984) (quoting Williston on Contracts § 61D (3d
ed. 1957)) (emphasis added). Clearly, if the provision of the First Addendum was an
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option, the December 8, 1999 letter did not properly evidence a willingness to exercise
the option and the district court should be reversed on this point.
V.

NORTH SALT LAKE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
Although not expressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a

motion to reconsider summary judgment is permitted where the summary judgment is
subject to revision (i.e., where summary judgment did not dispose of the whole case and a
final judgment has not been entered). Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah
1993) ("because the summary judgment was 'subject to revision,' a motion to reconsider
is a reasonable means of requesting such a revision and is therefore permitted."). Here,
the partial summary judgment ruling on liability did not dispose of the whole case, and
the City properly filed a motion to reconsider presenting new material facts and new legal
theories that had not already been considered. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, the City's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration was filed before the end of discovery and
before the district court had set a trial date. R. 253-55, 389-90.
A court can consider several factors in determining the
propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include,
but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is presented in a
"different light" or under "different circumstances;" (2) there
has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new
evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court does
not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its
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own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when
first contemplated by the court.
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P,2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Here, the issue of the basic enforceability of the Agreement, and thus the
UGA's right to damages, was presented in a new and different light in the City's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration. The district court had never heard or
considered any arguments regarding the City's lack of authority to dispose of public
property by gift or the Municipal Building Authority's lack of authority to convey
property to anyone other than the public body that created it, and the motion to reconsider
presented these new legal theories to the court in a timely way before a trial date had been
set. This controlling Utah law would have materially affected the outcome of the
litigation and should have been considered by the district court.
The district court also failed to consider controlling Utah law regarding
when a seller is required to have clear and marketable title, and as a result, it improperly
found that the City had anticipatorily breached its Agreement with the UGA. The district
court also failed to find that the title defect was irremediable—it found only that a defect
existed—and the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration presented
new material evidence that the City could in fact have cleared the title when the time
arrived for it to convey the UGA Property.
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Because the district court failed to consider this Utah law, a "manifest
injustice" resulted when the court did not reconsider its prior ruling. The Motion for
Summary Judgment and Reconsideration should have been granted, and the ruling of the
district court should be reversed.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING
BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN DAMAGES.
If this Court concludes that the Agreement provided consideration for the

UGA Property and that the City breached the Agreement, the district court erred in
calculating damages. In its Memorandum Decision, the district court stated that the UGA
"is entitled to the value of what it bargained for, that is, a lot that could be sold for its
highest use," and went on to award the UGA $158,441, which it determined to be the fair
market value of the lot. R. 446. The district court, however, made no deductions from
what it found to be the value of the UGA Property.
Under a correct measure of benefit-of-the-bargain damages, the value of the
property should have been reduced by the amount the UGA was supposed to pay for it
and any other costs the UGA avoided by not having to perform. See Bitzes v. Sunset
Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 71 (Utah 1982) (damages are difference between contract price
and market value); Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) ("Damages are
properly measured by the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a
position as if the contract had been performed."); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143,
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150-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 (expectation
interest damages must be reduced by uany cost or other loss . . . avoided by not having to
perform")- The district court did not even examine what the UGA was supposed to pay
for the property.
The one clear cost the UGA avoided by not having to perform, and which
the district court should have deducted, would have been the present value of the amounts
the UGA would have paid over the life of a 20-year lease. R. 565 at 139-40. Because the
district court made no deductions from the value of the UGA Property, it essentially
awarded the UGA a double recovery, i.e., a $158,441 cash award and forgiveness of
whatever amount it should have paid or costs it would have incurred under the
Agreement. "Such a double recovery [is] contrary to the benefit of the bargain rule,"
Brown, 840 P.2d at 150-51, and it results in an even more egregious violation of Utah law
than the original agreement contemplated by the parties.
Thus, even if the district court properly found that the Agreement was
supported by consideration and that the City breached the Agreement, the district court's
calculation of damages should be reversed and the matter remanded for a recalculation of
damages.
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VII.

IF THE CITY PREVAILS, THE COURT SHOULD AWARD IT
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AND REMAND FOR A
CALCULATION OF SUCH.
The Use Agreement provides for attorney fees and costs to the prevailing

party in litigation. R. 20. The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the UGA.
R. 550. If the City prevails on this appeal, it requests attorney fees and costs incurred on
this appeal and in the district court. In that case, the Court should remand to the district
court for a calculation of attorney fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City asks that this Court reverse the district
court's judgment and the rulings underlying that judgment. If the Court, however, agrees
with the district court that the Agreement had sufficient consideration and that the City
breached the Agreement, the Court should remand to the district court for a recalculation
of damages. If the City prevails on this appeal, it requests attorney fees and costs
incurred in this Court and in the district court.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2002.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Larry S. jfeokifls
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

44

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of April, 2002,1 caused to be mailed,
through the U.S. mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants,
to the following:

Lester A. Perry, Esq.
Hoole & King, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124-7557
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM

LESTER A. PERRY (2571)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION. INC.. a Utah
non-profit corporation;
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff.

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, Municipal Building Authority, a Utah
non-profit corporation,

00 0*7 0 03*101

Civil No.
Judge
jl

Defendants

For cause of action, the plaintiff complains against the defendants as follows:
I.

Parties and Jurisdiction.
1.

The plaintiff, Utah Golf Association, Inc. (referred to herein as the "UGA"), is a Utah

non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, state of Utah.

2.

The defendant, The City of North Salt Lake, Utah (referred to herein as "North Salt

Lake City" and the "City"), is a Utah municipal corporation, with its principal place of business in
Davis County, state of Utah.
3.

The defendant, The City of North Salt Lake. Utah, Municipal Building Authority

(referred to herein as "North Salt Lake Building Authority"), is a Utah non-profit corporation with
its principal place of business in Davis County, state of Utah. North Salt Lake City and North Salt
Lake Building Authority are collectively referred to herein as "North Salt Lake".
4.

The contract that is the subject of this lawsuit was signed by the UGA in Salt Lake

County, state of Utah.
II.

First Cause of Action - Breach of Contract.
5.

Prior to March 31,1992, North Salt Lake and a group of real estate developers were

engaged in the development of a large residential area of North Salt Lake City. This area is located
around the present Eaglewood Golf Course, high on the east bench of North Salt Lake City.
6.

In order to add value to the development for the developers and to provide recreation

and open space to Nonh Salt Lake City's residents, the developers and the City included a golf
course in their development plans.
7.

North Salt Lake City was to build the golf course and pay for the construction

through a development bond.
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8.

The UGA is the state of Utah's member/representative with the United State's Golf

Association, the governing body for the sport of golf in the United States, and, along with the Royal
and Ancient Golf Association in England, the governing body for the sport throughout the world.
9.

The presence of the UGA at the golf course would add credibility to the City's plans

to build a golf course and greatly aid North Salt Lake in obtaining funding for the golf course.
10.

As an inducement to convince the UGA to move its headquarters and the Utah Golf

Hall of Fame to the golf course, the developers and North Salt Lake agreed to transfer a building lot
next to the golf course to the UGA, which building lot could be used by the UGA to build its own
office building in the future or could be sold in the open market by the UGA.
11.

The developers and/or North Salt Lake prepared a written contract to be signed by

the parties.
12.

On or about March 31, 1999, the contract was executed by North Salt Lake City,

North Salt Lake Building Authority and the UGA. The contract is called "Office Use Agreement"
and a copy of the contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
13.

The original contract included an addendum called "First Addendum to Office Use

Agreement" (referred to herein as the "First Addendum"). A copy of the First Addendum is attached
hereto within Exhibit "A".
14.

The City obtained its funding for the golf course and its club house and commenced

their construction.
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15.

During the construction of the club house, the City discovered that it had mis-planned

the club house. Among the problems that were discovered were that the club house was not large
enough and the pro shop was in the wrong place. (The starter could not see the first tee from the pro
shop.)
16.

North Salt Lake approached the UGA and requested that the UGA aid them in

redesigning certain portions of the club house and relocating the pro shop into some of the space
originally allocated to the UGA under the contract.
17.

The UGA agreed to the changes and the golf course and club house were completed.

18.

The UGA moved its headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame to the club house.

19.

Another addendum was prepared to reflect these changes. This addendum is called

"Second Addendum to Office Use Agreement" and a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
20.

Both of the Addendums indicate that North Salt Lake Building Authority is the fee

title owner of the building lot promised to the UGA. Both Addendums indicate that the building lot
consists of 18,975 square feet and is 115' x 165'. The building lot is located on the east side of the
golf course parking lot.
21.

Both of the Addendums indicate that this building lot is the "UGA property" and shall

be zoned "Restricted Conditional Use*'. Such zoning allowed office buildings as a conditional use
and single family dwellings as a permitted use. Such uses conformed with the understanding of the
UGA at the time it negotiated the contract.
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22.

Both of the Addendums provided that the UGA could choose either to build its own

office building on the lot or sell the lot in the open market for the best price that it could obtain and
keep the proceeds from the sale.
23.

In 1997, North Salt Lake expressed to the UGA its need for expanded food service

areas at the golf course. North Salt Lake approached the UGA about building its office building on
the building lot, which office building would include a dining room and food preparation area that
would be leased by the City.
24.

To cooperate with this planned expansion, the UGA hired an architect to design an

office building for the UGA which was to be built on the lot. The UGA paid approximately
$3,000.00 for his plans.
25.

North Salt Lake then decided that it did not want to lease any portion of the proposed

UGA office building, but would rather expand the present club house and again realign the UGA
offices in the club house so that the City could add to its food service area. The UGA could not
afford to build the planned office building without a tenant for a portion of the building. Thus the
UGA abandoned its plans to build the office building and simply lost the $3,000.00 paid to the
architect.
26.

In the latter part of 1998, the UGA discovered that North Salt Lake did not own the

building lot at the time the contract was executed and that the building lot had only recently been
acquired from the Cannon family.
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27.

The Cannon family was part of the group of developers who were working with North

Salt Lake to develop the golf course and the surrounding residential area.
28.

The UGA then discovered that the Cannon family deeded a building lot to the City

in 1997 by a special warranty deed and the deed contained a significant land use restriction. The
UGA also discovered that the lot deeded by the Cannon family included only 17,768 square feet, not
the 18,975 square feet agreed to in the contract and its addendums. A copy of this Special Warranty
Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit UC".
29.

The land use restriction in the deed was that the building lot could only be used for

a golf course or for an office building owned by the UGA. If the lot was used for any other purpose,
the title to the lot would revert back to the Cannon family.
30.

This land use restriction gutted the value of the building lot to the UGA, because its

highest and best use was a residential building lot and the UGA could not sell the lot with the deed
restriction on the record title.
31.

The UGA informed North Salt Lake, at the 1997 meeting, that it expected the full

building lot to be transferred to it free and clear of any such deed restriction, as required by the
contract and the two addendums.
32.

The original term of the Office Use Agreement expired in 1999. The UGA desired

that a long term extension of the Agreement be entered into as required by the Agreement. The
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UGA notified North Salt Lake that any long term agreement had to include transfer of the full
building lot to the UGA without the deed restriction so that the lot could be sold by the UGA.
33.

North Salt Lake decided to treat the UGA as a month to month tenant until it could

resolve the dispute with the UGA. During this month to month tenancy, North Salt Lake considered
all other terms of the Agreement to be in full force and effect.
34.

The parties tried to resolve the problem during 1999. North Salt Lake eventually

failed to remove the deed restriction from the building lot and obtain the additional land that it was
obligated to transfer to the UGA. Because of this, North Salt Lake refused to transfer the full lot
without the restriction. The UGA stood by its contractual right to the full lot without the deed
restriction.
3 5.

North Salt Lake then evicted the UGA and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame from the club

36.

The fair market value of an 18,975 square foot lot is believed to be 5227,700.00.

house.

North Salt Lake has damaged the UGA by this amount.
37.

The UGA has also incurred the following approximate damages because of North Salt

Lake's eviction: 1) $40,000.00 in moving and relocation expenses for the UGA offices and the Utah
Golf Hall of Fame; 2) $10,000.00 for display cabinets for the Hall of Fame and storage of Hall of
Fame items during the move; 3) $40,000.00 business disruption costs and expenses: and 4)
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$3,000.00 lost golf course revenue under the Agreement. These damages total approximately
$93,000.00.
38.

The UGA has not yet negotiated a long term agreement with another landlord for its

headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame. It is believed that when such an agreement is finalized
that the rent that will need to be paid will greatly exceed the rent that was to be charged under the
Office Use Agreement with North Salt Lake. Any such additional rent will be damages to the UGA.
39.

Pursuant to the terms of the Office Use Agreement, the UGA is entitled to

reimbursement of all of its attorney's fees and court costs incurred herein.
III.

Second Cause of Action - Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing.
40.

In the Office Use Agreement and its addendums, there was an implied covenant

between the parties to deal reasonably, fairly and in good faith with each other.
41.

North Salt Lake breached this implied covenant by: 1) failing to have title to the full

building lot, thereby having the ability to perform its obligations, before executing the Agreement;
2) by failing to negotiate a long term extension of the Agreement with the UGA in a manner that
would not deprive the UGA of its right to the 18,975 square foot building lot without any deed
restriction; and 3) by evicting the UGA.
42.

This breach of the covenant caused the above alleged damages to the UGA.

Wherefore, the UGA prays the Court for judgment against the defendants, jointly and
severally, as follows:
8

1.

For the value of the 18,975 square foot lot of approximately $227,700.00;

2.

For approximately $125,525.00 in other damages:

3.

For approximately $200,000.00 for the added rent that will need to be paid to replace

the space provided by North Salt Lake;
4.

For all court costs and attorney's fees incurred herein;

5.

For prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the damages: and

6.

For such further relief deemed just and equitable by the Court.

DATED this yV-'day of January, 2000.
KESLERA RUST
ST)

TESTER A. PERRY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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1.

PARTIES.

This Agreement, dated, for reference purposes only, March «~2 1 . 1992, is made by and between
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation (herein called "City") and
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah non-profit corporation (herein called "User").
2.

PREMISES.

City does hereby grant to User the exclusive right to use, but not possession of, that certain office space
on the first and second floors of the clubhouse to be constructed at the proposed North Salt Lake Golf Course
(herein called "Premises"), a site plan of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference thereto is
made a pan hereof, said Premises being agreed, for the purposes of this Agreement, to have an area of
approximately 2,424 square feet; the Premises shall consist of eight offices, a reception area, a conference room,
and one private restroom; said building shall be constructed upon property in the City of North Salt Lake,
County of Davis, State of Utah, the legal description of which property is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and by
reference thereto if; made a pan hereof. City has leased the Premises and other property from the City of North
Salt Lake, Utah, Municipal Building Authority, a Utah non-profit corporation ("Building Authority"). This
Agreement transfers no interest whatsoever, leasehold or otherwise, in the Premises and User is not entitled to
possession of the Premises. User obtains by this Agreement a license to use the Premises solely for the purposes
described herein, [t is also hereby acknowledged by both City and User that Building Authority has not yet
acquired the real propeny upon which the Premises will be constructed, however Building Authority has entered
into agreements to acquire said real property provided that Building Authority is successful in procuring
sufficient financing for the acquisition and construction of the proposed municipal golf course. The obligations
of both City and User herein are hereby made subject to Building Authority obtaining municipal bond financing
in the principal amount of at least $5,910,000 and Building Authority receiving fee simple title to the real
property upon which the Premises shall be constructed. Said Agreement is subject to the terms, covenants and
conditions herein set forth and the User covenants as a material pan of the consideration for this Agreement to
keep and perform each and all of said terms, covenants and conditions by it to be kept and performed and that
this Agreement is made upon the condition of said performance.
3.

TERM.

(a)

Commencement and Ending Hate of Term. The right to use the Premises and the user fee obligation
shall commence on the date thirty (30) days after City, or City's supervising contractor, notifies User in
writing that City's construction obligations respecting the Premises have been fulfilled to the extent that,
in City's opinion, the Premises are ready for the use contemplated by User under this Agreement. The
Agreement Term shall thereafter continue for a period of FIVE (5) YEARS.
The date which is applicable under the foregoing part of this Section 3(a) is hereinafter referred to as
the "Commencement Date." Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to the provisions of Section
30(xi) of this Agreement, if the Commencement Date has not arrived prior to DECEMBER 31, 1993, or
if City has. not obtained financmg for the proposed golf course facility mentioned in Section 2, above,
and received fee simple title to the real property upon which the Premises shall be constructed, User
shall have the option to terminate this Agreement upon written notification to City as hereinafter
provided.
The term of this Agreement shall end on the last day of the Final Agreement Year, unless sooner
terminated as hereinafter provided in this Agreement.

(b)

Agreement Year Defined. The term "Agreement Year" as used herein shall mean a period of twelve
(12) full consecutive months. The first Agreement year shall begin on the Commencement Date if such
date falls on the first day of a calendar month. Otherwise, the first Agreement Year shall commence on
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4.

Agreement \car.

USER FEE AND LATE CHARGES.

User agrees to pay to City, without prior notice or demand, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($30,300.00) per year payable in equal monthly installments of TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE AND NO/100 ($2,525.00) per^month, which monthly
installment is due on or before the first day of the each calendar month of the term hereof. The user fee for any
period during the term hereof which is for less than one (I) month shall be a prorated portion of the monthly
installment herein, based upon a thirty (30) day month. The user fee shall be paid to City, without deduction or
offset, except as set forth herein, in lawful money of the United States of America, which shall be legal tender at
the time of payment at the office of the City, or to such other person or at such other place as City may from
time to time designate in writing. User hereby acknowledges that late payment by User to City of user fees or
other sums due hereunder will cause City to incur costs not contemplated by this Agreement, the exact amount
of which will be extremely difficult to ascertain. Such costs include, but are not limited to, processing and
accounting charges, and late charges which may be imposed upon City by terms of any mortgage or trust deed
covering the Premises. Accordingly, if any user fee payment or a sum due from User shall not be received by
City or City's designee within TEN (10) days of the due date thereof, User shall pay to City a late charge equal
to ten percent (10%) of such overdue amount. The parties hereby agree that such late charges represent a fair
and reasonable estimate of the cost that City will incur by reason of the late payment by User. Acceptance of
such late charges by the City shall in no event constitute a waiver of User's default with respect to such overdue
amount, nor prevent City from exercising any of the other rights and remedies granted hereunder.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event that, after receiving reasonable notice from User, the City fails to: (a)
provide services, utilities, maintenance, and repairs as required under this Agreement; or (b) diligently pursue and
prosecute its obligations under this Agreement, User hereby reserves the right to place the monthly user fee due
under this Agreement in an interest bearing escrow account until the City has resolved or is diligently pursuing a
resolution of the problem.

5.

SECURITY DEPOSIT.

Upon execution of this Agreement User shall deposit with City the sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($2,525.00). Said sum shall be held by City as security
for the faithful performance by User of all the terms, covenants, and conditions of this Agreement to be kept and
performed by User during the term hereof. If User defaults with respect to any provision of this Agreement,
including, but not limited to the provisions relating to the payment of user fees, City may: 1) elect to retain the
security deposit until the Agreement has expired; or 2)without being required to do so, use, apply or retain all or
any part of this security deposit for the payment of any user fee or any other sum in default, or for the payment
of any amount which City may spend or become obligated to spend by reason of User's default, or to
compensate City for any other loss or damage which City may suffer by reason of User's default. If any portion
of said deposit is so used or applied, User shall within five (5) days after written demand therefor, deposit cash
with City in an amount sufficient to restore the security deposit to its original amount and User's failure to do so
shall be a material breach of this Agreement. City shall not be required to keep this security deposit separate
from its general funds, and User shall not be entitled to interest on such deposit. If User shall fully and
faithfully perform every provision of this Agreement to be performed by it, the security deposit or any balance
thereof shall be returned to User at the expiration of the Agreement term. In the event of termination of City's
interest in this Agreement, City shall transfer said deposit to City's successor in interest.

6.

OPERATING EXPENSE ADJUSTMENTS.
For the purposes of this Article, the following terms are defined as follows:
Base Year Direct Expenses: The Base Year Direct Expenses include ail direct costs of operation and
maintenance, as determined by standard accounting practices, and includes the following costs by way
of illustration, but not limited to: real property taxes and assessments; rent taxes, gross receipt taxes,
(whether assessed against the Building Authority or assessed against the User and collected by the
Building Authority, or both); water and sewer charges; insurance premiums; utilities; management fees;
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maintenance; supplier, materials; equipment; and tools; including m^ienance, costs, and upkeep of ail
parking and common areas. ("Direct Expenses" shall not include depreciation on the Building of which
the Premises are a pan or equipment therein, loan payments, structural repairs or replacements,
advertising fees, consulting or marketing fees, costs of refinancing or mongage fees, leasing of
equipment not directly related to maintenance and repair of the Premises or its common areas, legal
fees, executive salaries or real estate brokers' commissions.)
Comparison Year: Each calendar year of the term after the Base Year.
Direct Expenses: All direct costs of operation and maintenance, as determined by standard accounting
practices, and shall include the following costs by way of illustration, but not be limited to: real
property taxes and assessments; rent taxes, gross receipt taxes, (whether assessed against the Building
Authority or assessed against the User and collected by the Building Authority, or both); water and
sewer charges; insurance premiums; utilities; management fees; labor; costs incurred in the management
of the Building, if any; air conditioning and heating; elevator maintenance; supplies; materials;
equipment; and tools; including maintenance, costs, and upkeep of all parking and common areas.
("Direct Expenses" shall not include depreciation on the Building of which the Premises are a part or
equipment therein, loan payments, structural repairs or replacements, advertising fees, consulting or
marketing fees, costs of refinancing or mortgage fees, leasing of equipment not directly related to
maintenance and repair of the Premises or its common areas, legal fees, executive salaries or real estate
brokers' commissions.)
If the Direct Expenses paid or incurred by the City for the Comparison Year on account of the operation
or maintenance of the Building of which the Premises are a pan are in excess of the Base Year Direct Expenses,
then the User shall pay its pro rata share of the increase. This percentage is that portion of the total useable area
of the Building used by the User hereunder. City shall endeavor to give to User on or before the first day of
March of each year following the respective Comparison Year a statement of the increase in fees payable by
User hereunder, but failure by City to give such statement by said date shall not constitute a waiver by City of
its right to require an increase in user fees. Upon receipt of the statement for the first Comparison Year, User
shall pay in fall the total amount of increase due for the first Comparison Year, and in addition for the then
current year, the amount of any such increase shall be used as an estimate for said current year and this amount
shall be divided into twelve (12) equal monthly installments and User shall pay to City, concurrently with the
regular monthly user fee payment next due Mowing the receipt of such statement, an amount equal to one (1)
monthly installment multiplied by the number of months from January in the calendar year in which said
statement is submitted to the month of such payment, both months inclusive. Subsequent installments shall be
payable concurrently with the regular monthly user fee payments for the balance of that calendar year and shall
continue until the next Comparison Year's statement is rendered. If the next or any succeeding Comparison Year
results in a greater increase in Direct Expenses, then upon receipt of a statement from City, User shall pay a
lump sum equal to such total increase in Direa Expenses over the Base Year Direa Expenses, less the total of
the monthly installments of estimated increases paid in the previous calendar year for which comparison is then
being made to the Base Year Direct Expenses; and the estimated monthly installments to be paid for the next
year, Mowing said Comparison Year, shall be adjusted to reflect such increase. If in any Comparison Year the
User's share of Direct Expenses be less than the preceding year, then upon receipt of City's statement, any
overpayment made by User on the monthly installment basis provided above shall be credited towards the next
monthly user fee payment falling due and the estimated monthly installments of Direa Expenses to be paid shall
be adjusted to reflea such lower Direct Expenses for the most recent Comparison Year. Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Article to the contrary, it is hereby agreed that User shall not be obligated to pay any
increases in Direa Expenses attributable to management fees; labor; costs incurred in the management of the
Building; air conditioning maintenance; heating maintenance; elevator maintenance; supplies; materials;
equipment; and tools; including maintenance, costs, and upkeep of all parking and common areas, where such
increases exceed the cumulative increase in the Consumer Price Index ("CPI Cap") since the Commencement
Date. However it is understood and agreed that there shall be no such CPI Op on increases in Direct Expenses
attributable to real property taxes and assessments, rent taxes, gross receipt taxes, water and sewer charges,
insurance premiums, and utilities.
Even though the term has expired and User has discontinued use of the Premises, when the final
determination is made of User's share of Direa Expenses for the year in which this Agreement terminates, User
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in the event said expenses decease shall be immediately rebated by Ciiy to
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article, the user fee payable by User shall in no event be
less than as specified in Article 5 hereinabove.
7.

CONSTRUCTION.

(a)

Improvements, [f the Premises and the building containing the same are not currently in existence, City
shall, at its own cost and expense, construct and complete said building and certain improvements to
Premises for User's use, incorporating in such construction all applicable items of work described in
Exhibit nC". In addition, User, at its own cost and expense, shall construct and install its fixtures and
equipment and shall perform the other work set forth on Exhibit "C" incorporating in such construction
all applicable items of work described on Exhibit "C\ User shall have the right to enter the Premises
and to obtain keys thereto to perform User's work prior to the commencement date but after City has
given notice pursuant to Section 3; in so doing, however, User shall comply with direction of the City
and shall not interfere with any of City's construction activities. During such entry all of User's
obligations hereunder, except the obligation to pay user fees, shall be in full force and effect. Any work
other than or in addition to the items specifically enumerated as City's work on Exhibit "C" shall be
performed by User at its own cost and expense and only after obtaining written consent from City,
which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. City shall cause all of the construction which is to
be performed by it to be completed, and the Premises ready for User to install its fixtures and
equipment and to perform the other work described on Exhibit "C" as soon as reasonably possible, but
in no event later than December 31, 1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 30(xi), in the event
City's construction obligations have not been fulfilled by December 31, 1993; or if City has not obtained
financing for the proposed golf course facility mentioned in Section 2, above, and received fee simple
title to the real property upon which the Premises shall be constructed, User shall have the right to
exercise any right or remedy available to it under applicable law, including the right to terminate this
Agreement, except that under no circumstances shall City be liable to User for any incidental or
consequential loss or damage to User resulting from delay in construction.

(b)

Changes to Golf Course rVvHopmoit City hereby reserves the right at any time to make changes,
alterations or additions, in or on the building in which the Premises are contained, anywhere on the Site
Plan shown on Exhibit "A", or elsewhere in the Golf Course Development. User shall not, in such
event, claim or be allowed any damages or right to terminate this Agreement for injury or inconvenience
occasioned thereby.

8.

USE.

User shall use the Premises solely for general office purposes and for the home of the Utah Golf Hall of
Fame. User shall not use or permit the Premises to be used for any other purpose without the prior written
consent of City. User shall not do or permit anything to be done in or about the Premises nor bring or keep
anything therein which will in any way increase the existing rate of or affea any fire or other insurance upon the
Building or any of its contents, or cause cancellation of any insurance policy covering said Building or any part
thereof or any of its contents. User shall not do or permit anything to be done in or about the Premises which
will in any way obstruct or interfere with the rights of other tenants or occupants of the Building or injure or
annoy them or use or allow the Premises to be used for any improper, immoral, unlawful or objectionable
purpose, nor shall User cause, maintain or permit any nuisance in, on or about the Premises. User shall not
commit or suffer to be committed any waste in or upon the Premises.
9.

COMPLIANCE WITH LAW.

User shall not use the Premises or permit anything to be done in or about the Premises which will in
any way conflict with any law, statute, ordinance or governmental rule or regulation now in force or which may
hereafter be enacted or promulgated. User shall, at its sole cost and expense, promptly comply with all laws,
statutes, ordinances and governmental rules, regulations or requirements now in force or which may hereafter be
in force, and with the requirements of any board of fire insurance underwriters or other similar bodies now or
hereafter constituted, relating to, or affecting the condition, use or occupancy of the Premises, excluding
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competent jurisdiction or the admission of User in any action against User, v^cther City be a party thereto or
not, that User has violated any law, statute, ordinance or governmental rule, regulation or requirement, shall be
conclusive of that fact as between the City and User.
10.

ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS.

City and User shall make improvements to the Premises as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto and
by reference thereto is made a part hereof. Subsequent to the installation of the improvements set forth in
Exhibit "C, User shall not make or suffer to be made any alterations, additions or improvements to or of the
Premises or any part thereof without the written consent of City first had and obtained and any alterations,
additions or improvements to or of said Premises, including, but not limited to, wall covering, paneling and
built-in cabinet work, but excepting movable furniture and trade fixtures, shall on the expiration of the term
become a part of the realty and belong to the City and shall be surrendered with the Premises. In the event City
consents to the making of any alterations, additions or improvements to the Premises by User, the same shall be
made by User at User's sole cost and expense, and any contractor or person selected by User to make the same
must first be approved of in writing by the City. Upon approving any additional alterations or additions to be
installed by User, City shall also designate which items shall be removed by User, at User's expense, upon
termination of this Agreement. Upon the expiration or sooner termination of the term hereof, User shall, upon
written demand by City, given at least thirty (30) days prior to the end of the term, at User's sole cost and
expense, forthwith and with all due diligence remove any alterations, additions, or improvements made by User,
previously designated by City to be removed, and User shall, forthwith and with all diligence at its sole cost and
expense, repair any damage to the Premises caused by such removal.
11.

MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS.

(a)

User shall, at User's sole cost and expense, keep the Premises and every pan thereof in good condition
and repair, damage thereto from causes beyond the reasonable control of User and ordinary wear and
tear excepted. Except as specifically provided In an addendum, if any, to this Agreement, City shall
have no obligation whatsoever to alter, remodel, improve, repair, decorate or paint the Premises or any
part thereof and the panics hereto affirm that City has made no representations to User respecting the
condition of the Premises or the Building except as specifically herein set forth.

(b)

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 11(a) hereinabove, it is mutually understood by all parties
hereto that City is obligated to maintain and repair the common areas, landscaping and all of the
building systems unless any damage thereto results from the negligent or willful acts of the User. City
shall repair and maintain the structural portions of the Building, including the basic plumbing, air
conditioning, heating, and electrical systems, installed or furnished by City, unless such maintenance and
repairs aire caused in part or in whole by the act, neglect, fault or omissions of any duty by the User, its
agents, servants, employees or invitees, in which case User shall pay to City the reasonable cost of such
maintenance and repairs. City shall not be liable for any failure to make any such repairs or to perform
any maintenance unless such failure shall persist for an unreasonable time after written notice of the
need of such repairs or maintenance is given to City by User. User agrees to provide, at its sole cost,
janitorial and cleaning services to the Premises. Except as provided in Article 22 hereof, there shall be
no abatement of user fees and no liability in or to any portion of the Building or the Premises or in or
to fixtures, appurtenances and equipment therein. User waives the right to make repairs at City's
expense under any law, statute or ordinance now or hereafter in effect.

12.

LIENS.

User shall keep the Premises and the property in which the Premises are situated free from any liens
arising out of any work performed, materials furnished or obligations incurred by User. City may require, at
City's sole option, that User shall provide to City either a cash bond or, at User's sole cost and expense, a lien
and completion bond. The cash bond or the lien and completion bond shall both be in an amount equal to one
and one-half (1-1/2) times of any and all estimated cost of any improvements, additions, or alterations in the
Premises, to insuie City against any liability for mechanics' and materialmen's liens and to insure completion of
the work.

UGA License Agrmt.

-5-

03/26/92

i e

User shall not either voluntarily or by operation of law, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate
or encumber this Agreement or any interest therein, and shall not sublicense the said Premises or any pan thereof
without first obtaining the written consent of the City, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
14.

HOLD HARMLESS.

(a)

User to Hold City Harml^ User shall indemnify and hold harmless City against any and all claims
arising from User's use of the Premises for the conduct of its business or from any activity, work, or
other thing done, permitted or suffered by the User in or about the Building, and shall further indemnify
and hold harmless City against and from any and all claims arising from any breach or default in the
performance of any obligation on User's pan to be performed under the terms of this Agreement, or
arising from any act or negligence of the User, or any officer, agent, employee, guest, or invitee of
User, and from all and against all cost, attorney's fees, expenses and liabilities incurred in or about any
such claim or any action or proceeding brought thereon, and, in any case, action or proceeding be
brought against City by reason of any such claim, User upon notice from City, shall defend the same at
User's expense by counsel reasonably satisfactory to City. User as a material pan of the consideration
to City hereby assumes ail risk of damage to property or injury to persons, in, upon or about the
Premises, from any cause other than City's negligence, and User hereby waives all claims in respect
thereof against City.

(b)

City to Hold User Harml*^ City shall indemnify and hold harmless User against any and all claims
arising from City's use of the Premises for the conduct of its business or from any activity, work, or
other thing done, permitted or suffered by the City in or about the Building, and shall further indemnify
and hold harmless User against and from any and all claims arising from any breach or default in the
performance of any obligation on City's pan to be performed under the terms of this Agreement, or
arising from any act or negligence of the City, or any officer, agent, employee, guest, or invitee of City,
and from all and against all cost, attorney's fees, expenses and liabilities incurred in or about any such
claim or any action or proceeding brought thereon, and, in any case, action or proceeding be brought
against User by reason of any such claim, City upon notice from User, shall defend the same at City's
expense by counsel reasonably satisfactory to User. City agrees to indemnify and hold User harmless
from any damages resulting from the negligence of User or its agents.
City or its agents shall
not be liable for any damage to propeny entrusted to employees of the Building, nor for loss or damage
to any propeny by theft or otherwise, nor for any injury to or damage to persons or property resulting
from fire, explosion, falling plaster, steam, gas, electricity, water or rain which may leak from any pan
of the Building or from the pipes, appliances or plumbing works therein or from the roof, street or
subsurface or from any other place resulting from dampness or any other cause whatsoever, unless
caused by or due to the negligence of City, its agents, servants or employees. City or its agents shall
not be liable for interference with the light or other incorporeal hereditaments, loss of business by User,
nor shall City be liable for any latent defect in the Premises or in the Building. User shall give prompt
notice to City in case of fire or accidents in the Premises or in the Building or of defects therein or in
the fixtures or equipment.

15.

SUBROGATION.

As long as their respective insurers so permit, City and User hereby mutually waive their respective
rights of recovery against each other for any loss insured by fire, extended coverage and other propeny insurance
policies existing for the benefit of the respective panies. Each pany shall obtain any special endorsements, if
required by their insurer, to evidence compliance with the aforementioned waiver.
16.

LIABILITY INSURANCE.

Both City and User shall each, at their own expense, obtain and keep in force during the term of this
Agreement a separate policy of comprehensive public liability insurance in the amount of $500,000.00 insuring
each other against any liability arising out of the ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance of the Premises and
all areas appunenant thereto. The limit of said insurance shall not, however, limit the liability of the either pany
hereunder. Said insurance may be pan of a blanket policy, providing, however, said insurance by User shall
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17.

SERVICES AND UTILITIES.
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18.

PROPERTY TAXES.
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„ „ shall fai,hf„lly Ota*™ a»d comply with ,hc n t o ^
" ^ f °» ' ^
A ^ - . as *hibi, -D- a»d * » * — * « . » « * ^ ^ » J m « ^ I
time to make all reasonable modifications to said rules. The additions <m

(

"
,

^ t £ t to. »
J ? . * , shall b .
03/26792

UGA License Agrmt.

nuupciiurmancc 01 any said niiw by any other occupants.
20.

ENTRY BY CITY.

City shall at any and all times and, upon reasonable notice to the User, have the right to enter the
Premises, inspect the same, supply janitorial service and any other service to be provided by City to User
hereunder, to post notices of non-responsibility, and to alter, improve or repair thq Premises and any portion of
the Building of which the Premises are a part that City may deem necessary or desirable, and may for that
purpose erect scaffolding and other necessary structures where reasonably required by the character of the work
to be performed, always providing that the entrance to the Premises shall not be blocked thereby, and further
providing that the business of the User shall not be interfered with unreasonably. User hereby waives any claim
for damages or for any injury or inconvenience to or interference with User's business, any loss of occupancy or
quiet enjoyment of the Premises, and any other loss occasioned thereby. For each of the aforesaid purposes, City
shall at all times have and retain a key with which to unlock all of the doors in, upon and about the Premises,
excluding User's vaults, safes and files, and City shall have the right to use any and ail means which City may
deem proper to open said doors in an emergency, in order to obtain entry to the Premises without liability to
City except for any failure to exercise due care for User's property. Any entry to the Premises obtained by City
by any of said means, or otherwise shall not under any circumstances be construed or deemed to be a forcible or
unlawful entry into, or a detainer of, the Premises, or an eviction of User from the Premises or any portion
thereof.
21.

RECONSTRUCTION.

In the event the Premises or the Building of which the Premises are a part are damaged by fire or other
perils covered by extended coverage insurance, City agrees to forthwith repair the same; and this Agreement
shall remain in full force and effect, except that User shall be entitled to a proportionate reduction of the user fee
while such repairs are being made, such proportionate reduction to be based upon the extent to which the making
of such repairs shall materially interfere with the business carried on by the User in the Premises. If the damage
is due to the fault or neglect of User or its employees, there shall be no abatement of user fees.
In the event the Premises or the Building of which the Premises are a part are damaged as a result of
any cause other than the perils covered by fire and extended coverage insurance, then City shall forthwith repair
the same, provided the extent of the destruction be less than ten percent (10%) of the then full replacement cost
of the Premises or the Building of which the Premises are a part. In the event the destruction of the Premises or
the Building is to an extent greater than ten percent (10%) of the full replacement cost, then City shall have the
option: (1) to repair or restore such damage, this Agreement continuing in full force and effect, but the user fee
to be proportionately reduced as hereinabove in this Article provided; or (2) give notice to User at any time
within sixty (60) days after such damage terminating this Agreement as of the date specified in such notice,
which date shall be no less than thirty (30) and no more than sixty (60) days after the giving of such notice. In
the event of giving such notice, this Agreement shall expire on the date so specified in such notice and the user
fee, reduced by a proportionate amount, based upon the extent, if any, to which such damage materially
interfered with the business carried on by the User in the Premises, shall be paid up to date of such termination.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Article, City shall not have any obligation
whatsoever to repair, reconstruct or restore the Premises when the damage resulting from any casualty covered
under this Article occurs during the last twelve (12) months of the term of this Agreement or any extension
thereof. City shall not be required to repair any injury or damage by fire or other cause, or to make any repairs
or replacements of any panels, decoration, office fixtures, railings, floor covering, partitions, or any other
property installed in the Premises by User. The User shall not be entitled to any compensation or damages from
City for loss of the use of the whole or any part of the Premises, User's personal property or any inconvenience
or annoyance occasioned by such damage, repair, reconstruction or restoration.
22.

DEFAULT.

The occurrence of any one or more of the following events shall constitute a default and breach of this
Agreement by User.
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(a)

Discontinuing use of

(b)

The failure by User to make any payment of user fees or any other payment required to be made by
User hereunder, within TEN (10) days of the due date thereof.

(c)

The failure by User to observe or perform any of the covenants, conditions or provfaions <of t t e
Agreement to be observed or performed by the User, other than descrtbed in Articl' ^ > * ° * '
^
<° U s e r '
2 d , failure shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days after wrmer n.nce *£**<**
provided, however, that if the nature of User's default is such that m e than thirty30)days are
reasonably required for its cure, then User shall not be deemed to be in default if User commences such
cure within said thirty (30) day period and thereafter diligently prosecutes such cure to completion.

k

(d)

23.

.. Premises by User.

The making by User of any general assignment or general arrangement for the benefit of creditors; or
the filing by or against User of a petition to have User adjudged a bankrupt, or a petition or
reorganization or arrangement under any law relating to bankruptcy (unless, m the case °f a petition
filed against User, the same is dismissed within sixty (60) days); or the appointment of a trus ee or a
receiver to take possession of substantially all of User's assets located at the Premises or of Users
interest in this Agreement, where possession is not restored to User within thirty (30) days; o « "
Attachment, execution or other judicial seizure of substantially all of User's asset:; locatedat the Premises
or of User's'interest in this Agreement, where such seizure is not discharged in thirty (30) days.
REMEDIES IN DEFAULT.

In the even, of any such material default or breach by User, City may at any time thereafter, with or
without notice or demand and without limiting City in the exercise of a right or remedy which City may have by
reason of such default or breach:
(a)

Terminate User's right to use the Premises by any lawful means, in which case this A g r e e d *aU
terminate. In such event City shall be entitled to recover from User all damages incurred by City by
reason of User's default. City shall also be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in an
action for damages. Unpaid user fees or other sums shall bear interest from the date due at the rate ot
eighteen percent (18%) per annum.

(b)

Pursue any other remedy now or hereafter available to City under the laws or judicial decision of the
State in which the Premises are located.

24.

ESTOPPEL STATEMENT.

User shall at any time and from time to time upon not less than ten (10) days' prior written notice from
City execute, acknowledge and deliver to City a statement in writing, (a) certifying that this ^ e e m ^ *
unmodified Lid in full force and effect (or, if modified, stating the nature of such modification and certifying
Ztt-Agreement
as so modified, is in fall force and effect), and the date to which the user fees a n d o t h ^
charges aVTpaid in advance, if any; and (b) acknowledging that there are not, to User's knowledgemy uncured
defaults on the part of the City hereunder, or specifying such defaults if any are claimed; and (c) the
clmencement Date and the Termination Date of this Agreement. Any such statement may_ be* « J « M £ ° *
any prospective purchaser or encumbrancer of all or any portion of the real property of which the Premises are
part.
25.

PARKING.

User shall have the right to use the parking facilities of the Building subject «**
f ' \ ™ * ^ ^
for such parking facilities which may be established or altered by City at any time or from time to time during
the term hereof.
26.

CORPORATE AUTHORITY.

Each individual executing this Agreement on behalf of said corporation represents and warrants that he
is duly authorized to execute and deliver mis Agreement on behalf of said corporation, in accordance with a duly
03/26792
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dates spccuica lmmcuwiciy
City:

User:

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,

UTAH GOLF
a Utah non

a Utah municipal corporation
^fsp/sTPVPUd*

By:

OlON, INC
•ration

By:

/fo#

J-

(Print Name)

xts_

IMA-V*A

Til

$/./HA*/

(Print Name)

its_

The Build Authority acknowledges this Agreement between the City and the User and hereby agrees
that should the City default on its obligations owed to the Building Authority under the lease agreement benveen
them, the Building Authority will nonetheless honor this Agreement and allow the User to continue to use the
Premises for the duration of the Agreement Term.
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY,
a Utah non-profit corporation

By:

7). id- f-7//y//l>7*/tf S_
(print name)

Its
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EXHIBIT "A"
FT/)OR PTAN O F PRFMISFS
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EXHIBIT "B"
LFHAT. nPSCRIPTTON OF THF PROPERTY
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EXHIBIT "C"
IMPROVFyTr^nr ORMCATTONS OF CITY AND USER

City shall be responsible to furnish and install the following improvements after User has
reviewed and approved the plans relating thereto:
Finish electrical
Finish HVAC
Finish mechanical/plumbing
Dropped ceilings
Interior partitions
Walls sheetrocked, paint-ready
Restroom finished
All interior finish items except the following items to be completed by User.
User shall be responsible for the following:
(City will provide the following allowance for tenant improvements. Any improvements beyond the
allowance indicated shall be the responsibility of User.)
Carpeting
Window Covering
Painting, moldings, trims

$1.45/sq.ft. allowance
$ .85/sq.ft. allowance
S2.10/sq.ft. allowance

Total Allowance

$4.40/sq.ft.

It is agreed by the parties that the above improvement obligations plus the improvement
allowance shall also apply to the 888 additional square feet of space provided for the Utah Golf Hall of Fame.
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Rplf* anH Regulations

1.
No sign, placard, picture, advertisement, name or notice shall be inscribed, displayed or printed or
affixed on or to any part of the outside or inside of the Building without the written consent of the City first had
and obtained, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. All approved signs or lettering on doors shall
be printed, painted, affixed or inscribed at the expense of the User. The User shall not place anything or allow
anything to be placed near the glass of any window, door, partition or wall which may appear unsightly from
outside the Premises; provided, however, that the City may furnish and install a Building standard window
covering at ail exterior windows. The User shall not without prior written consent of the City cause or otherwise
sunscreen any window.
2.
The sidewalks, halls, passages, exits, entrances, elevators and stairways shall not be obstructed by User
or used for any purpose other than for ingress and egress from the Premises.
3.
The User shall not alter any lock or install any new or additional locks or any bolts on any doors or
windows of the Premises without the prior consent of the City, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld.
4.
The toilet rooms, urinals, wash bowls and other apparatus shall not be used for any purpose other than
for the purpose for which they were constructed and no foreign substance of any kind whatsoever shall be
thrown therein and the expense of any breakage, stoppage, or damage resulting from the violation of this rule
shall be borne by the User who, or whose employees or invitees shall have caused it.
5.
The User shall not overload the floor of the Premises or in any way deface the premises or any pan
thereof.
6.
No furniture, freight or equipment of any kind shall be brought into the Building without the prior
notice to the City and all moving of the same into or out of the Building shall be done at such time and in such
manner as the City shall designate. The City shall have the right to prescribe the weight, size and position of all
safes and other heavy equipment brought into the Building and also the times and manner of moving the same in
and out of the Building. Safes or other heavy objects shall, if considered necessary by the City, shall stand on
supports of such thickness as is necessary to properly distribute the weight, the City will not be responsible for
loss of or damage to any such safe or property from any cause and ail damage done to the Building by movmg
or maintaining any such safe or other property shall be repaired at the expense of the User.
7.
The User shall not use, keep or permit to be used or kept any foul or noxious gas or substance in the
Premises, or permit or suffer any other person (the employees, agents, servants and invitees of User excepted) to
occupy or use the said Premises, or any portion thereof, without the written consent of the City first had and
obtained, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Consent to one assignment, sublicensing,
occupation or use by any other person shall not be deemed to be a consent to any subsequent assignment,
sublicensing, occupation or use by another person.
8.
No cooking shall be done or permitted by User on the Premises, except for microwave cooking by
User's employees or coffee pots, nor shall the Premises be used for the storage of merchandise, for washing
clothes, for lodging, or for any improper, objectionable or immoral purposed.
9.
The User shall not use or keep in the Premises or the Building any kerosene, gasoline or inflammable or
combustible fluid or material, or use any method of heating or air conditioning other than that supplied by the
City.
10.
The City will direct electricians as to where and how telephone and telegraph wires are to be
introduced. No boring or cutting for wires will be allowed without the consent of the City. The location of
telephones, call boxes and other office equipment affixed to the Premises shall be subject to the approval of the
City, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
11.
When the Building is not in use the Building shall be locked and access thereto shall be limited to
Building Users or employees of Building Users and their guests, which Users or User's employees have keys to
UGA License Agrmt.
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error wiin regard to tne adm*.—on to or exclusion from the Building of any person. In case of invasion, mob,
riot, public excitement, or other commotion, the City reserves the right to prevent access to the Building during
the continuance of the same by closing of the doors or otherwise, for the safety of the tenants and protection of
property in the Building and the Building.
12.
The City reserves the right to exclude or expel from the Building any person who, in the judgment of
the City, is intoxicated or under the influence of Liquor or drugs, or who shall inAany manner do any act in
violation of any of the rules and regulations of the Building.
13.
No vending machine or machines of any description shall be installed, maintained or operated upon the
Premises without the written consent of the City.
14.
The City shall have the right, exercisable without notice and'without liability to the User, to change the
name and street address of the Building of which the Premises are a part.
15.
The User shall not disturb, solicit, or canvass any occupants of the Building and shall cooperate to
prevent same.
16.
The City shall have the right to control and operate the public portions of the Building, and the public
facilities, and heating and air conditioning, as well as facilities furnished for the common use of the tenants, in
such manner as it deems best for the benefit of the tenants generally.
17.
All entrance doors in the Premises shall be left locked when the Premises are not in use, and ail doors
opening to public corridors shall be kept closed except for normal ingress and egress from the Premises.

UGA License Agrmt.

-17-

03/26792

FIRST ADDENDUM TO
OFFICE USE AGREEMENT

THIS FIRST ADDENDUM TO OFFICE USE AGREEMENT is made this

day of^March

992

y

„ , berweTn THE CITY OF NORTH SALT IAKE
U T A B L a U t a h ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ S J ^ S ^
CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH ^ % ^ ^ ^ O ^ ^ U u h
non-profit
corporation (the "Building Authority"), and UTAH GOLF A S S O C I A T E , i r ^ ,
corporation ("User").
RECITALS:

City and User entered into a certain OFFICE USE AGREEMENT of evendate herewith,

K

wherein City agreed", construct and User agreed to use - H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e a t T e
rPremises") which space shall be located in the Clubhouse (the Clubhouse I to be construe!
L £ ^ Course (thT-Golf Course"), in the City of North Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah.
B.

Building Authority is the fee title owner of a certain parcel of real F

W

g

Property") consisting of approximately 18,975 square feet ^
^
^
^
^
„
be located to the east of the proposed Clubhouse. The legal description of the UGA nope y
as Exhibit "A". The UGA Property shall be zoned "Restricted Conditional Use.

j

North Salt

^

^

attac hed hereto

As an inducement for User to enter into a use agreement City is
^ Z ^ t e M
C
no cost the exclusive use of 888 additional square feet of space in the lobby of the Clubhouse for the Utah
Hall of'Fame, which area shall be open to the public during normal business hours.

™

D.

As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement, C i t y j wiUmg to gnmt to User
exclusive use of the proposed golf course and use of golf carts for a total of two (2) * ^ ™ T ^
"
year of L term of the use agreement for tournaments which are hosted and/or sponsored by User.
As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement,
^ ^ " J ^ *
E.
User exclusive use of and access to the Golf Course Practice Drivmg Range for a total of two (2) hours pe
week for training purposes in conjunction with its Junior Golfers program.
F.

As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement, ™ M * A ^ £ ^ >
convey to User the UGA Property for the purpose of consttuctior, o f £ r t ^ ^ c S S T S Z terms and
Golf Hall of Fame and executive offices said budding to be for Users ^ £ £ ^
Uscr „
e l c c t s n l t0
conditions hereinafter set forth. However, in the event User
° /^TV . w U l i n g t 0 ^ant said
desirous of obtaining an Option to Extend the Agreement Term. Building Authonty is willing
gr
Option based upon the terms and conditions set forth herein.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set f o r n i x . * *
Agreement, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are
acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
,
HMTOFFAMF.UIHBY. During the term of this
J ^ ^ ^ £ ? S o ^ 5 .
exclusive use of 888 additional square feet of space in ^ < = ^ « ^ J ^ c ^
^
business
purpose of housing the Utah Golf Hall of Fame, which ™ * ^ ! » * £ „ £ « « k m of! the space in
IZs.
By this Agreement, User obtains merely the use of. **""££
" v d ^ a d d i t i o n a l spVce to User
which the Utah Golf Hall of Fame will be located. City hereby agrees to provide sai
free of charge for the entire term of occupancy by User.
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Agreement or any extension ^../eof or in the event User has constructed the ^GA Facility on the UGA Property
as set forth in Section 4, below, City hereby grants to User the exclusive access to and use of the golf course
and of the golf carts for a total of two (2) ten-hour weekdays each year of the use term for tournaments which
are hosted and/or sponsored by User. All green fees paid by tournament participants during said two weekdays
shall be retained by User. In the event that the golf course is not tournament-ready as determined by both User
and City, then it is hereby agreed that the two-day use of the golf course granted herein for the applicable year
may be postponed and used in a subsequent year.
3.
EXCLUSIVE USE OF PRACTICE DRIVING RANGE. During the term of this Agreement or
any extension thereof or in the event User has constructed the UGA Facility on the UGA Property as set forth in
Section 4, below, City hereby grants to User exclusive access to and use of the Practice Driving Range for a
total of two (2) hours per week for training purposes in conjunction with its Junior Golfers program. User shall
retain all fees charged to participants in User's Junior Golfers program during said two hour period.
4.
BUILDING AUTHORITY TO CONVEY TO USER UGA PROPERTY FOR
CONSTRUCTION OF UGA HEADQUARTERS AND UTAH GOLF HALL OF FAME If at any time after the
fourth Agreement Year of this Agreement User elects to construct its permanent headquarters and the Utah Golf
Hall of Fame on the UGA Property (collectively the "UGA Facility"), User shall deliver to Building Authority
written notice thereof (the "Construction Notice"). The Construction Notice shall set forth the proposed
occupancy date of the UGA Facility and shall be accompanied by a rendering and floor plan of the proposed
UGA Facility. Upon review and approval of the final plans for the UGA Facility by the City of North Salt Lake
and its staff, Building Authority shall cause the UGA Property to be conveyed, at no cost to User, by Special
Warranty Deed to User. The conveyance of the UGA Property to User shall be subject to the following deed
restrictions: (a) that in the event that User does not complete construction of the UGA Facility as approved,
within twelve (12) months after conveyance of the UGA Property to User, title to the UGA Property shall revert
to Building Authority; and (b) User shall maintain the UGA Golf Hall of Fame at the UGA Facility for at least
ten (10) years after conveyance of the UGA Property to User or title to the UGA Property shall revert to
Building Authority. It is hereby understood and agreed that User shall be solely responsible for the cost of the
construction of improvements upon the UGA Property and that User shall diligently pursue completion of the
construction of the UGA Facility as approved by Building Authority. User shall use its best efforts to ensure
that the construction of the UGA Facility does not interfere with City's use of the Clubhouse. Upon occupancy
of the UGA Facility by User this Agreement shall terminate. The use of the UGA Facility shall be limited to the
Utah Golf Hall of Fame (which area shall be open to the public during normal business hours), headquarters of
User, and executive offices, unless otherwise agreed to by the City of North Salt Lake. The UGA Facility may
be a two-story structure, provided that User must provide on-site parking of one parking stall for every 250
square feet of gross leasable space.
5.
USER TO HAVE RIGHT TQ SELL UGA PROPERTY. In the event that User elects not to
construct the UGA Facility, User shall have the right to sell the Deeded Property and receive the proceeds from
said sale only upon the following conditions:
a.

User shall enter into a long-term (twenty years) use agreement for the Premises with a provision for an
annual three percent (3%) increase in the base user fee for the extended term; and
Building Authority shall have a right of first refusal to buy the right to use the UGA Property from
User. If User proposes to sell, assign, convey, or otherwise dispose of all or any part of his interest in
the UGA Property, User shall first make a written offer to sell such interest in the UGA Property to the
Building Authority on the same terms and conditions on which User proposes to sell, assign, convey or
otherwise dispose of such interest. Such offer shall state the name of the proposed transferee and all the
terms and conditions of the proposed transfer, including the price to the proposed transferee, and shall
be accompanied by a copy of the offer from the proposed transferee. Building Authority shall have the
right for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of the offer from User to elect to purchase all of the
interest in the UGA Property offered. To exercise its right to purchase, the Building Authority shall
give written notice to User. Upon exercise of a right to purchase and, provided the right is exercised
with respect to all of the interests in the UGA Property offered, the purchase shall be closed and
payment made on the same terms as set forth in the offer received by User from the proposed
transferee. If the Building Authority does not elect to purchase all of the interest in the UGA Property
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the UGA Property u • \ e r and User may transfer the offered inters. *i the UGA Property to the
proposed transferee named in the offer to the Building Authority. However, if that transfer is not made
within ninety (90) days after the end of the ninety (90) day period provided for herein, a new offer shall
be made to the Building Authority and the provisions of this Right of First Refusal shall again apply.
c.

To preserve the architectural design and intent of the golf course clubhouse and the development in the
immediate area of the clubhouse City shall have the right to approve the development and architectural
plans of the third party buyer with respect to the UGA Property.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this FIRST ADDENDUM TO OFFICE USE
AGREEMENT on the date first above written.

City:

User:

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
a Utah municipal corporation

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.
a Utah non-profit non-p/6fit corporation

Km^rPPPTteZs

By:

By:

ml &W*£**,J
(Print Name)

(Print Name)

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY,
a Utah non-profit corporation

By:

J). l0.

^trtAlfir/*?

(print name)

IK

Tt£$lI)ENr~
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SECOND ADDENDUM TO
OFFICE USE AGREEMENT

THIS SECOND ADDENDUM TO OFFICE USE AGREEMENT is made this 3rd day
of January, 1994, by and between THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, a Utah
municipal corporation (the "City"), THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation (the "Building
Authority"), and UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah'non-profit corporation ("User").
RECITALS:
A.
City and User entered into a certain OFFICE USE AGREEMENT and FIRST
ADDENDUM TO OFFICE USE AGREEMENT on or about March 31, 1992, wherein City
agreed to construct and User agreed to use approximately 2,424 square feet of office space
("Premises"), which space was to have been located in the Clubhouse (the "Clubhouse") to be
constructed at the North Salt Lake Golf Course (the "Golf Course"), in the City of North Salt
Lake, Davis County, Utah.
B.
City and User desire to amend their prior agreements so as to provide that the
City construct and User shall pay for the use of approximately £T7TsquarNiBet of office space
("Premises"), rather than the 2,424 square feet originally contemplated, which space shall be
located in the Clubhouse (the "Clubhouse") to be constructed at the North Salt Lake Golf Course
(the "Golf Course"), in the City of North Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah.
C.
Building Authority is the fee title owner of a certain parcel of real property (the
"UGA Property") consisting of approximately 18,975 square feet (size of lot = 115' x 165')
which UGA Property shall be located to the-eSsT^f the proposed Clubhouse. The legal
description of the UGA Property is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The UGA Property shall
be zoned "Restricted Conditional Use."
D.
Due to unforeseeable circumstances, certain uses and rentable areas contemplated
in the original agreement between the parties have necessarily been adjusted so as to be
consistent with the actual construction and ultimate use of the premises by each of the respective
v
parties.
C l t y imtialI
.... E y agreed to provide to User, at no cost, the exclusive use of 888
additional square feet of space in the lobby of the Clubhouse for the Utah Golf Hall of Fame,
which area was required to be open to the public during normal business hours. However, the
parties have agreed to amend their prior agreement so as to require the City to provide to User,
at no cost, the use of 7-10 square feet in the lobby of the Clubhouse for Utah Golf Hall of Fame.
UGA Use Agreemenl
M«y6, 1994

*

This area shall be open to the public during normal business hours.
F.
As an inducement for User to consent to the amendmentsrequjxed herein * e O t y
shall maie available to User a minimum ^ ^ d i d o n a l square feet of storage space access
in the basement of the Clubhouse.
0.

City is .OUn, to granUo *«<££>£££%

^ £ £ £ ° 3 £

«

derived from the rental of said golf carts during such tournaments.
As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement. City h; wming
to provS'e to User exclusive use of and access to the Golf Course Practice Dnvjng Range for
T t o S o f U o (2) hours per week for training purposes in conjunction with its Junior Golfers
p ™
^ relenue generated from said Golf Course Practice Dnving Range for those two
(2) hours per week shall be shared by the User and the City 50/5U.
H

I
As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement, Building
Authority agrees to convey to User the UGA Property for the purpose of c o n * ^ f ° ^ U * e r *
™ £ hlaoTuarters, the Utah Golf Hall of Fame and executive offices. Said building;Kbe
f o u r ' s sde use, in accordance with the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. However
£ the^venaJser e ects not to construct a new building, User is desirous of o ^ n m g an Opuon
To Stend tne Agreement Term. Building Authority is willing to grant said Option based upon
the terms and conditions set forth herein.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set.forth
in this Agreement, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows.
1
AMFNDMFNT TO TTSFB FRF. AND r ATF. CHARGES. The parties agree that
p a r a g r a P h 4 of ^ O F F I C E USE AGREEMENT d a ^ T t o c h l H * * shall be amended to
read as follows:
User a»r=es to pay to City, without prior n o t e or demand, the sum of T W E N " " ^ ?
W W M V * ^ . ^ ^ * * ^ ,
raOUSA^D AND ™
DOLLARS
installments of TWO THOUSAND EIGHTY-THREE AND 34/100 ($2,083 34) per mo
whfch monthly installment is due on or before the first day o « h ~ n t h * e term
hereof The user fee for any period during the term hereof which is for less than one u ;
S t p r o r a t e d portiJof die monthly installment herein ta*g> ***%
W H £
s
0
month. The user fee shall be paid to City, withou < *^* £%IZ%^at
the time
herein, in lawful money of the United States of America, ^
^
^
^
*
Qty may
of payment at the office of the City or to, ^ o * = r ^ " J ^ a t h / ayment by User
from time to time designate in writing. User hereby acicnowicugw
v
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to City of user fees or other sums due hereunder will cause City to incur costs not contemplated
by this Agreement, the exact amount of which will be extremely difficult to ascertain. Such
costs include, but are not limited to, processing and accounting charges, and late charges which
may be imposed upon City by terms of any mortgage or trust deed covering the Premises.
Accordingly, if any user fee payment or a sum due from User shall not be received by City or
City's designee within TEN (10) days of the due date thereof, User shall pay to City a late
charge equal to ten percent (10%) of such overdue amount. The parties hereby agree that such
late charges represent a fair and reasonable estimate of the cost that City will incur by reason
of the late payment by User. Acceptance of such late charges by the City shall in no event
constitute a waiver of User's default with respect to such overdue amount, nor prevent City from
exercising any of the other rights and remedies granted hereunder. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, in the event that, after receiving reasonable notice from User, the City fails to: (a)
provide services, utilities, maintenance, and repairs as required under this Agreement; or (b)
diligently pursue and prosecute its obligations under this Agreement, User hereby reserves the
right to place the monthly user fee due under this Agreement in an interest bearing escrow
account until the City has resolved or is diligently pursuing a resolution of the problem.
2.
HALL OF FAME LOBBY During the term of the Office Use Agreement, City
hereby grants to User the exclusive use of 710 additional square feet of space in the Clubhouse
at the North Salt Lake Golf Course for the purpose of housing the Utah Golf Hall of Fame,
which area shall be open to the public during normal business hours. By this Agreement, User
obtains merely the use of, but no interest in or possession of, the space in which the Utah Golf
Hall of Fame will be located. City hereby agrees to provide said additional space to User free
of charge for the entire term of occupancy by User,
3.
EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TD GOLF COURSE FOR TOURNAMENTS. During
the term of this Agreement or any extension thereof or in the event User has constructed the
UGA Facility on the UGA Property as set forth in Section 6, below, City hereby grants to User
the exclusive access to use the golf course and of the golf carts for a total of two (2) ten-hour
weekdays each year of the use term for tournaments which are hosted and/or sponsored by User.
All green (ees paid by tournament participants during said two said weekdays, shall be retained
by User; User and City shall share 50/50 any revenue generated from the use of golf carts;
however, any revenue generated from the use of rental clubs, and other concessions at the golf
course, shall be paid to the City.
4

EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TQ PRACTICE DRIVING RANGE. During the term
of this Agreement or any extension thereof or in the event User has constructed the UGA
Facility on the UGA Property as set forth in Section 6, below, City hereby grants to User
exclusive access to and use of the Practice Driving Range for a total of two (2) hours per week
for training purposes in conjunction with its Junior Golfers program. User and City shall share
50/50 all revenues generated from range balls charged to participants in User's Junior Golfers
program during said two hour period on the Practice Driving Range.

UGA Use Agreement
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5EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TO STORAGE SPACE IN CLUBHOUSE. During the
term of this Agreement or any extension thereof, and provided that the User is still leasing the
2,178 square feet of office space in the Clubhouse, City hereby grants to User exclusive access
to a minimum of 125 square feet of storage space in the Clubhouse basement. Said storage area
shall be designated by the City for the exclusive use and benefit of the User at no additional
cost.
6.
BUTLDrNG AUTHORITY TO rO^^VEY TO USER UGA PROPERTY FOR
CONSTRUCTION OF UGA HEADQUARTERS AND UTAH GOLF HALL OF FAME. If
at any time after the fourth Agreement Year of this Agreement User elects to construct its
permanept headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA Property (collectively the
"UGA Facility"), User shall deliver to Building Authority written notice thereof (the
"Construction No dee"). The Construction Notice shall set forth the \proposed occupancy date
of the UGA Facility and shall be accompanied by a rendering and floor plan of the proposed
UGA Facility. Upon review and approval of the final plans for the UGA Facility by the City
of North Salt Lake and its staff, Building Authority shall cause the UGA Property to be
conveyed, at no cost to User, by Special Warranty Deed to User. The conveyance of the UGA
Property to User shall be subject to the following deed restrictions: (a) that in the event that
User does not complete construction of the UGA Facility as approved, within twelve (12)
months after conveyance of the UGA Property to User, title to the UGA Property shall revert
to Building Authority; and (b) User shall maintain the UGA Golf Hall of Fame at the UGA
Facility for at least ten (10) years after conveyance of the UGA Property to Use r or title to the
UGA Property shall revert to Building Authority. It is hereby understood and agreed that User
shall be solely responsible for the cost of the construction of improvements upon the UGA
Property and that User shall diligently pursue completion of the construction of the UGA Facility
as approved by Building Authority. User shall use its best efforts to ensure that the construction
of the UGA Facility does not interfere with City's use of the Clubhouse. Upon occupancy of
the UGA Facility by User, this Agreement shall terminate. The use of the UGA Facility shall
be limited to the Utah Golf Hall of Fame (which area shall be open to the public during normal
business hours), headquarters of User, and executive offices, unless otherwise agreed to by the
City of NQrth Salt Lake. The UGA Facility may be a two-story structure, provided that User
must provide on-site parking of one parking stall for every 250 square feet of gross leasable
space.
7.
USER TO HAVE RIGHT TO SELL UGA PROPERTY. In the event that User
elects not to construct the UGA Facility, User shall have the right to sell the Deeded Property
and receive the proceeds from said sale only upon the following conditions:
a.

UGA Use Agreement
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User shall enter into a long-term (twenty years) use agreement for the Premises
upon such terms and conditions agreed upon between the parties on or before the
expiration of the original five (5) year Agreement Term set forth in paragraph
3(a) of the March 31, 1992 Office Use Agreement; and
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Building Authority shall have a right of first refusal to buy the right to use the
UGA Property from User. If User proposes to sell, assign, convey, or otherwise
dispose of all or any part of his interest in the UGA Property, User shall first
make a written offer to sell such interest in the UGA Property to the Building
Authority on the same terms and conditions on which User proposes to sell"
assign, convey or otherwise dispose of such interest. Such offer shall state the
name of the proposed transferee and all terms and conditions of the proposed
transfer, including the price to the proposed transferee, and shall be accompanied
by a copy of the offer from the proposed transferee. Building Authority shall
have the right for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of the offer from User
to elect to purchase all of the interest in the UGA Property offered. To exercise
of a right to purchase and, provided the right is exercised with respect to all of
the interests in the UGA Property offered, the purchase shall be closed and
payment made on the same terms as set forth in the offer received by User from
the proposed transferee. If the Building Authority does not elect to purchase all
of the interest in the UGA Property offered in accordance with the provisions of
this Right of First Refusal, Building Authority shall convey the UGA Property to
User and User may transfer the offered interest in the UGA Property to the
proposed transferee named in the offer to the Building Authority. However, if
that transfer is not made within ninety (90) days after the end of the ninety (90)
day period provided for herein, a new offer shall be made to the Building
Authority and the provisions of this Right of First Refusal shall again apply.
To preserve the architectural design and intent of the golf course clubhouse and
the development m the immediate area of the Clubhouse, City shall have the right
to approve the development and architectural plans of the third party buyer with
respect to the UGA Property.

UGA U « Agreement
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this SECOND ADDENDUM TO
OFFICE USE AGREEMENT on the date first above written.

City:

User:

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH
a Utah municipal corporation

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.
a Utah non-profit non-profit corporation

By:

By:
OLASZB A • JONES
(Print Name)
its

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY,
a Utah non-profit corporation

By:

A^,

Qjmz A- Jones
(Print Name)

' ty.-N=>Wu/ W

QudLre^—

6
VGA UJC Agreement
M i y 6 , 1994

M

e >/$&*

*\ In?h
Ph\^n

u

£_J&d£/WJ

(Print Name)

UTAH
GOLF
ASSOCIATION
1110 East Eaglewood Drive
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
(801) 299-UGA1 FAX (801) 299-9409

^?£uA'

*•»*<«« T o u r * * *

BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Doug Baxter, President
lee Samsel, Vice President
jeanme Coddard Secretary
Robert "Bud" Paul, Treasurer
Arlen Peacock, Director
Tonv Bermingham, Director
Mike Dmitnch, Director
Clea Rasmussen, Director
Paul Hatch, Director
Parley Petersen, Director
Mike jorgensen Director
Dick Wood, Director

December 8,1999

Executive Director
Joe Watts

Mayor Jim Dixon
North Salt Lake
North Salt Lake, Utah
Dear Mayor Dixon:
We have decided that the major obstacle in the negotiation of a new lease is the
difference of opinion we share on the value of the lot.
We have been negotiating a price on the lot out of a consideration and courtesy to North
Salt Lake. We have been offering you a chance to buy the lot from us so that you
wouldn't have to go to the extra expense of clearing the developer's lien. Because we
have been unable to agree on a value of the lot we have decided to abide by the original
agreement.
We will agree to sign a 20-year lease at $32,000 per year, with reasonable increases
based on an agreeable Consumer Price Index to be reviewed every five years. Other
terms of our present lease would stay in place.
This offer is made on the basis that we will be given clear deed to the property as per our
original agreement. It should be understood that we will not accept the deed with the
restrictions that have been placed on it by the developer.
Please get back to us as soon as possible. We are anxious to resolve this matter. If your
side has the perception that we have been trying to delay this process your perception is
entirely in error. The delay in negotiating has been caused by our willingness to give you
a fair opportunity to purchase the lot and to keep it under your control without you having
to go to the extra expense of removing that deed restriction that has muddled this entire
process.
Sincerely,

Doug Baxter
President

CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE
20 South Hwy.89 P.O. Box 540208
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054-0208
(801)298-3877

December 9, 1999

JAMES W. DDCON
Mayor
COLLIN H. WOOD
City Manager

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT
Douglas A. Baxter
President
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION
1110 East Eaglewood Drive
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
RE: Utah Golf Association Lease
Dear Mr. Baxter:
The Mayor and City Council considered the status of the UGA's lease at the Eaglewood
Golf Course during their council meeting last Tuesday evening. Since the expiration of your
lease for office space at the North Salt Lake Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse in January of
this year, the City has attempted to negotiate the terms of a new long-term lease consistent with
the provisions of paragraph 7(a) of the Second Addendum to the Office Use Agreement. Those
efforts have unfortunately been unsuccessful. It does not appear that the Utah Golf Association
and the City will be able to reach mutually agreeable terms for the continuation of the UGA as
a tenant at the Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse.
In addition, it has been represented to the City that the UGA does not wish to construct
the UGA facility on the property adjacent to the Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse. Please be
advised that if it is the UGA's intent to construct its permanent facility on the lot adjacent to the
Eaglewood Clubhouse, written notice to that effect must be delivered to the City within thirty
(30) days from the date of this letter and the enclosed notice of termination of your lease
pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Second Addendum to the Office Use Agreement.
In closing, let me state that the City has appreciated its association with the UGA, an
association which has been positive for the past five plus years. Unfortunately, the economics

Douglas A. Baxter
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION
December 9, 1999
Page 2
related to an ongoing Lessor-Lessee situation for both parties are apparently not feasible.
Sincerely,
CITY 0 ^ t o * T & skLT LAKE

KLC/moc
cc:
Mayor James Dixon
City Councilmembers
Collin Wood
Scott Gardner

NOTICE TO QUIT AND
TERMINATION OF MONTH-TO-MONTH LEASE

TO THE UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah non-profit corporation, 1110 East
Eaglewood Drive, North Salt Lake, Utah, TENANTS IN POSSESSION.
You are hereby notified that the month-to-month lease on the above premises shall
terminate effective December 31, 1999, and you shall be required to deliver up possession of
the premises to the Lessor or its duly authorized managing agent no later than 12:00 midnight,
December 31, 1999.
Said premises are known as Eaglewood Golf Course Club House, 1110 East Eaglewood
Drive, North Salt Lake, Utah. In the event of your failure to vacate said premises by December
31, 1999, you'will be unlawfully be detaining possession of said premises, and in accordance
with the provision's of Section 78-36-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, you will be liable for treble
damages for such unlawful detainer, and action will be commenced against you to evict you
from said premises and to take judgment against you for the rent accrued and for three times the
damages assessed by the court for unlawful detainer, together with the costs of legal action.
This notice is given and served in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-36-3 and
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Section 78-36-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
DATED this ^ J j ! day of December, 1999.
CITY OF N<

Served by Personal Service:
Service date:

/*?

~/O

~-<?'?

By

/VJSsz^//

AJc^o

r^~\

Title: £'C " -{-£**#« -f~ /(JS£/><£>

Served by:
Signature
Served by Posting on Premises:

Served on:

Served by:

Title:
Signature

Served by Mail:
Mailed a copy of the foregoing notice via certified mail to Doug Baxter, President,
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, 1110 East Eaglewood Drive,/lorthjSalt Lake, Utah 84054, this
*day of December, 1999.

Third Judicial Disstct

KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN of
CHRISTIANSEN & CHRISTIANSEN
P.O. Box 11751
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 359-3762
Attorneys for Defendants

MAY 1 6 23G3
. /
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah non-profit
corporation,
Plaintiff,

]
;)
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
) TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
;) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, ])
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation;
;
and THE CITY OF NORTH SALT
])
LAKE, UTAH, MUNICIPAL
]
BUILDING AUTHORITY, a Utah non- ;
profit corporation,
]
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY

Civil No. 000900561
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

]

)
:ss
)

James W. Dixon, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit.

All statements

hereinafter set forth within this Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my personal and direct

i

Clubhouse whereupon the UG A permanent headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame would
be constructed. (The subject property is hereinafter referred to as the "UGA Property"). After
construction, the use of the UGA facility was to be limited to the Utah Golf Hall of Fame and
the UGA headquarters. (See First and Second Addenda to Office Use Agreement at paragraph
6).
7.

In the event that the UGA elected not to construct its permanent headquarters and

the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the subject property, the UGA would have been permitted to sell
the property upon the condition that (a) the UGA enter into a long-term (twenty year) use
agreement at the North Salt Lake Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse upon such terms and
conditions agreed upon between the parties on or before the expiration of the original five (5)
year Agreement Term; and (b) that the City shall have first right of refusal to buy the UGA
property; and (c) the City reserved the right to approve all development and architectural plans
for any use on the subject property. (See First and Second Addenda to Office Use Agreement
at paragraph 7).
8.

The City believed title to the subject property had been deeded to the City at the

time the City originally acquired the Eaglewood Golf Course from its developer. The actual
conveyance of the subject property to the City occurred on or about September 19, 1997. See
Special Warranty Deed.
9.

Fee title to the subject lot was conveyed to the City at that time by Special

Warranty Deed subject to the easements and rights of way of record and a use restriction that
the property be used only for a golf course or as an office for the Utah Golf Association (the
"UGA").

3

10.

The original five (5) year Agreement Lease Term expired and the UGA failed to

either exercise its option to build its permanent headquarters on the subject property; or to enter
into a

long-term (twenty year) lease at the North Salt Lake Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse.
11.

The UGA thereafter continued to rent space at the clubhouse on a month-to-month

basis.
12.

After the original Lease Agreement had expired, the City and the UGA made

numerous unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement for a new lease at the Eaglewood Golf
Course Clubhouse.
13.

On or about December 9, 1999, the City terminated the month-to-month lease

with the UGA by providing the UGA with proper written notice. The UGA vacated the
premises on or about December 31, 1999 and moved their offices to another location in Salt
Lake County.
FURTHER THY AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this i^/*day of May, 2000.

[A/mPA
JamsyW. Dixon

*J QU

On this l k _ day of May, 2000, personally appeared before me James W. Dixon, the
signer of the foregoing, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Ull-K^
NOTARY
S V PPUBLIC]
Residing at: V

MyC om

c

NOTARY PUBLIC

n txpi^TE0FUTAH
My Commission Expires
July 7 2001
TIFFIN! JOHN
140 West 9000 South
Sandy Utah 84070

Third Judicial District

JUL 14 2000
M-T LAKE CO

By.

M

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah non-profit corporation;
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 000900561

vs.
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, a Utah municipal
corporation; and THE CITY OF
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, i
Utah non-profit corporation,
Defendants•

The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the
plaintiff seeking a ruling on its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda,

the Court rules as stated herein.
In its Motion, the plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the
issue of liability for breach of contract. On March 13, 1992, the
parties entered into an Office Use Agreement.
subsequently executed by the parties.

Two Addendums were

The First Addendum recites

that as inducement for the plaintiff to enter into the Use
Agreement, the defendant City of North Salt Lake, Utah, Building

UTAH GOLF V. CITY
OF NORTH SALT LAKE

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

Authority ("Building Authority11), agrees to convey a parcel of real
property (referred to in the First Addendum as the MUGA property")
to the plaintiff

"for the purpose of construction

of

[its]

corporate headquarters, the Utah Golf Hall of Fame and executive
offices . . . "

(First Addendum at para. F).

The First Addendum

at paragraph B states that the Building Authority "is the fee title
owner" of the UGA property.
The plaintiff's position, as supported by the Affidavit of Joe
Watts, the plaintiff's executive director, is that the defendants
breached the Use Agreement because the Building Authority did not
originally have fee title to the UGA property. Moreover, when the
defendants finally acquired title to the property by Special
Warranty Deed, the plaintiff contends that the deed restrictions
and a reduced lot size compromised the value of the property.
The defendants focus not on their ability to convey fee title
to

the

plaintiff,

conveyance.

but

the

conditions

precedent

to

such

a

The defendants assert that under the Use Agreement,

together with the Addendums, if the plaintiff elected not to
construct on the UGA property, one of the conditions precedent to
the plaintiff acquiring the property would have been for it to
enter into a twenty-year lease upon mutually agreeable terms. The
defendants1 position is that since the parties were not able to
reach an agreement with respect to the terms of this twenty-year

UTAH GOLF V. CITY
OF NORTH SALT LAKE
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lease, the plaintiff never acquired any right to conveyance of the
property.
It is well-settled that under certain circumstances, the
effect of an anticipatory breach discharges any remaining duties,
including the performance of conditions precedent, of the injured
party.

See County of Solano v. Valleio Redevelopment Agency, 75

Cal. App. 4th 1262 (Ca. App. 1999) ; E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts,
Second Edition §8.20 (1990). Therefore, the threshold issue is
whether the defendants1 ability to transfer to the plaintiffs the
UGA property subject to easements and rights of way of record and
a use restriction constitutes an anticipatory breach which excused
the plaintiff's performance of the conditions precedent set forth
in the Addenda.

To answer this question, the Court must first

ascertain whether the Building Authority's agreement to convey the
UGA property, which it represented to own as "the fee title owner",
contemplated the conveyance of an unencumbered, unrestricted title
to the plaintiff.
The Court determines that in giving the plaintiff the option
to sell the UGA property to a third party, the parties clearly
intended that the defendants would convey title which would not
restrict the possibility

of such a sale.

However,

it is

undisputed that the restriction appearing in the Special Warranty
deed did preclude this possibility because it required that the lot

UTAH GOLF V. CITY
OF NORTH SALT LAKE
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be used only for an addition to the City's golf course or as the
plaintifffs headquarters. As the plaintiff points out, because of
this restriction, the UGA property could not be sold to anyone
other than the City or the plaintiff.

Since the defendants were

unable to lift this restriction, their inability to perform at
least

some

of the

obligations

under

the parties1

Agreement

constitutes an anticipatory breach.
As stated previously, an anticipatory breach will generally
excuse the nonoccurrence of a condition precedent.
(Second) of Contracts §255
§471(1) (A party's

Restatement

(1977). See also 17 CJS Contracts

anticipatory breach

may excuse

party's performance, even of conditions precedent

the other

to performance

by the breaching party) ; J. Murray, Murray on Contracts §188 at p.
366-67

(If, when the time for the happening of a condition

precedent arrives, it

appears that the promise that is qualified

by the condition cannot be performed by the promisor, the general
rule is that the condition is excused . . . . If it is reasonably
certain that the promisee will not receive that which is the
contemplated exchange for the performance of the condition, there
is every reason why he should not be required to perform the
condition as a preliminary to the recovery of compensation for
defeated expectations . . . . ) .

However, the rule excusing the

non-occurrence of conditions precedent does not apply "[w]hen the

UTAH GOLF V. CITY
OF NORTH SALT LAKE
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promisee could not, or would not, have performed the condition in
any event [i.e., whether or not the promisor repudiated] • . . . w
Id. : Comment a to Section 255 of the Restatement; 4 A. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts § 978 at p. 924 (1951) .

For example, in

Ufitec. S.A. v. Trade Bank & Trust Co., 249 N.Y.2d 557, 560 (N.Y.
1964), the court stated, "an anticipatory breach, in a proper case,
may excuse one for performing a useless act, but it does not excuse
one from the obligation of proving readiness, willingness, and
ability to have performed the conditions precedent."
Therefore, the next issue is whether the plaintiff could have
performed the conditions in any event.

Since it was not possible

for the plaintiff to sell the property to a third-party, the
condition

concerning

right

to

approve

the

development

and

architectural plans of a third-party buyer is not applicable. The
same can be said of the condition of right of first refusal.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the 20-year
lease provision

of the

Second

Addendum

is an

unenforceable

"agreement to agree". Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc.,
558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976).

Therefore, the 20-year lease

provision of the First Addendum is controlling.
December

8,

1999,

letter

to

the

defendants

The plaintiff's
evidences

the

plaintiff's readiness and willingness to enter into the required
20-year lease for more rent than required by the First Addendum.

UTAH GOLF V. CITY
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Accordingly, the plaintiff has demonstrated that it could have
perrormeatne 20-year lease condition if the defendants had not
first breached the Agreement•
the

defendants•

anticipatory

The Court therefore concludes that
breach

excused

performance of the conditions precedent.

the

plaintifffs

The plaintifff s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore granted/
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an Order consistent
with this Minute Entry decision and submit the same to the Court
for review and signature•

/

FILED DirRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

WOOD CRAPO LLC
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539
Larry S.Jenkins #4854
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lalce City, Utah 84111
(801)366-6060

JAN 1 7 2001
1/

SALT LAKE COUNTY

Kent L. Christiansen #4207
Christiansen & Christiansen
P.O. Box 11751
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
(801) 359-3762
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah non-profit corporation,
Plaintiff,

]
)
;)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMAR Y
JUDGMENT AND RECONSIDERATION

V.

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT
LAKE, UTAH, a Utah municipal
corporation; and THE CITY OF
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit
corporation,
Defendants.

;
;
;)
;
;)
;
]
]

Civil No. 000900561
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants, The City of North Salt Lalce, Utah and The City of North Salt Lalce,
Utah Municipal Building Authority (collectively the "City"), respectfully move the Court for an
order granting summary judgment in their favor. The grounds are that the agreement to transfer

the building lot to plaintiff, as interpreted by the Court, is ultra vires and unenforceable under
Utah law. No consideration at all was offered, given, or required by plaintiff for the
lot—essentially it was to be a gift from the City for plaintiff agreeing to office at the Eaglewood
Golf Course clubhouse. Utah law requires that a city receive in exchange for city property
present value that reflects fair market value. The City was to receive no value, let alone fair
market value for the lot and, as such, the agreement is ultra vires and void.
The City also asks that the Court reconsider its ruling on plaintiffs motion for
partial summary judgment. Neither the parties nor the Court considered the effect of the general
rule applicable in land sales that a seller is not required to have title to real property until the time
arrives for closing of the sale. A question of fact exists whether the alleged defect in title in this
case could have been remedied. This issue was never explored, discussed, or argued by the
parties.
This motion is supported by a memorandum and affidavits in support filed
contemporaneously.
DATED this _ Q d a y of January, 2001.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Mary Anne WOOCK
Larry S. Jenkins
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Jf|_ day of January, 2001,1 caused to be mailed in the
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, to the following:
Lester A. Perry, Esq.
Kessler & Rust
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

WOOD CRAPO LLC
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539
Larry S. Jenkins #4854
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)366-6060

JAN \ 7 2001

Kent L. Christiansen #4207
Christiansen & Christiansen
P.O. Box 11751
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
(801)359-3762
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah non-profit corporation,

v.

;
;
)
;)
)
])

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT
LAKE, UTAH, a Utah municipal
corporation; and THE CITY OF
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit
corporation,
Defendants.

;
]
;
;
;)
;
])
]

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' MEMORAND UM IN
SUPPOR T OF THEIR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Civil No. 000900561
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

20.

The First Addendum and Second Addendum both provide that if plaintiff

elected to enter into a twenty-year use agreement and sell the Lot, the City would have a right of
first refusal on the Lot. First Addendum <j 5; Second Addendum 11 7.
21.

The City obtained title to the Lot in 1997 from one of the developers of the

golf course and surrounding subdivision, but the special warranty deed transferring the Lot to the
City contained deed restrictions that allowed it to be used only for construction of plaintiff s
headquarters or for other golf course purposes. Amended Complaint ^f 29.
22.

Neither plaintiff nor the City approached the developer to ascertain

whether the deed restrictions could be released. Affidavit of Mary Wood Cannon ("Cannon
Aff.")1f 5, Exhibit E.
23.

In fact, the developer is and was willing to release the deed restrictions if

the City would have agreed to exercise its right of first refusal. Cannon Aff. f 6.
24.

This Court ruled that plaintiff was excused from entering into a

twenty-year use agreement with the City because the City was in anticipatory repudiation of the
agreement between the parties. The Court found that the City was in breach because it did not
have unrestricted title to the Lot. Minute Entry at 3-6.
25.

Following the Court's ruling, plaintiff believes it is entitled to receive the

fair market value of the Lot as one element of its damages, and plaintiff claims that value is
$190,000. Interrogatory Responses (Exhibit D), response to Interrogatory No. 4, and Exhibit F,

vii

which is a copy of the summary of the Christensen appraisal referred to in the interrogatory
answer.
26.

The City has obtained tenants for about 1450 square feet of the space

formerly used by plaintiff. The City has taken over the rest of the space used by plaintiff,
including the space used for the Utah Golf Hall of Fame. Seven hundred square feet of the space
formerly used by plaintiff is now leased for $14.50 per square foot and 750 square feet is leased
at $10.00 per square foot, for an average rate of $12.17 per square feet. Affidavit of L. Scott
Gardner1 ("Gardner Aff.") (Exhibit G) <fi| 3-4.
27.

Those using the space under the agreements referenced in the preceding

paragraph are not allowed exclusive use of the golf course and they are not allowed to keep green
fees or golf cart rentals as plaintiff was allowed under the Second Addendum. Gardner Aff. *[ 5.

L

Filed herewith is a facsimile copy of the Gardner Affidavit. The original will be
filed with the court as soon as counsel receives it.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE AGREEMENT TO TRANSFER THE BUILDING LOT IS ULTRA
VIRES AND UNENFORCEABLE.
A.

Actions to Give Away Public Property are Ultra Vires In Utah.

The Utah Supreme Court has long held that a municipality holds its property "in
trust for the use and benefit of its inhabitants and [such property] cannot be disposed of by gift
without specific legislative authority." Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118, 119 (Utah 1975). To
avoid being an illegal gift, a transfer of municipal property must be made 'in good faith and for
an adequate consideration." Id. "Adequate consideration" is defined as a "present benefit that
reflects the fair market value" of the property transferred. Municipal Bldg. Authority of Iron
County v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). As such, the consideration
cannot be speculative or provide a future benefit. Id. It must be real present benefit. The Court
must be able to specify "exactly what [the] benefit is. in present market value terms," and a
"general finding" of some benefit is not sufficient. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. Salt Lake
County Attorney , 1999 UT 73, % 32, 985 P.2d 899, 910 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added).
In Sears, Ogden City wanted to vacate a street and give the land to the Board of
Education of Ogden City. The street divided the campus of Ogden High School. The Supreme
Court held that Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2, which allows a city to "dispose" of its property, did
not allow disposal by gift, but only for "adequate consideration." 533 P.2d at 119. The
substance of that statute has not changed since Sears was decided.

1

In Lowder, the county wanted to transfer an old jail and its site to the county's
building authority for a nominal sum as part of an agreement that would provide for a new jail
for the county and transfer the site back to the county in twenty years. Even though a public
benefit could be seen in the transfer, the Supreme Court disallowed the transfer because the
county would not receive "present benefit that reflects the fair market value" of the property
transferred. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282. The Court said the benefit "is a speculative and future
benefit that cannot suffice to validate a present transfer of the fee." Id.
In Salt Lake County Comm fn, the Supreme Court ruled that contributions to
certain charities by Salt Lake County were illegal even though the district court had found they
provided the County a benefit. The district court believed "'[e]ach of the payments is intended to
achieve a specific result' and that the result 'is a benefit to the County, the value of which may
well exceed the sum expended, perhaps by a substantial amount.'" 1999 UT at % 32, 985 P.2d
at 910. The Supreme Court invalidated the transfers, however, because the contributions "were
not tied to any specific services to be rendered," and the county failed to provide "a detailed
showing of the benefits to be obtained from the money given." Id.
It is critical that the Court see from these cases that the kind of consideration
required for the transfer of public property is not just the typical "bargained for exchange"
required in contracts generally. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 and comment c
(consideration can be mixture of bargain and gift and courts generally will not scrutinize gift
part). The consideration required for public property must be real and substantial. It must be
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"present benefit that reflects fair market value." Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282. When the transfer is
for nominal, speculative, future, or no consideration, the transfer is illegal. Moreover, the Court
is charged with specifying "exactly what [the] benefit is, in present market value terms." Salt
Lake County Comm 7?, 1999 UT 73, f 32, 985 P.2d at 910 (emphasis added).
B.

The Agreement of the Parties Provided No Consideration for the Lot.

When the First Addendum and Second Addendum are examined, it is clear that
while there was consideration for the use of the office space at the clubhouse by plaintiff, there
was no consideration of the type required by Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n
provided for the Lot. And, while the one condition precedent for plaintiff to be able to keep the
proceeds from the sale of the Lot was to enter into a twenty-year use agreement for the office
space, this Court has ruled what the amount was plaintiff had to pay for the twenty-year
agreement that never happened, and this amount likely is below market for just the use of the
office space. Thus, it cannot be argued that the twenty-year use agreement was to be
consideration for the Lot. The agreement to allow plaintiff to keep the proceeds from the sale of
the Lot is ultra vires because it completely lacks the type of consideration required by Sears,
Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n.
The Court held that the user fee for the twenty-year use agreement would have
been three percent above the base fee paid under the Office Use Agreement, with the amount
going up three percent annually. Minute Entry at 5. That means, plaintiff would have had to pay
$25,750 the first year, and so forth, because the base rate set forth in the Second Addendum is
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$25,000 per year. Second Addendum If 1. The Court, however, also ruled that plaintiff was not
required to enter into a twenty-year use agreement to get the Lot because the City did not have
unrestricted title to the Lot. Minute Entry at 3-5.
Assuming a twenty-year use agreement had been executed at $25,750 per year for
2178 square feet that would be $11.82 per square feet. Yet, the City also allowed plaintiff to use
another 710 square feet at no charge for the Utah Golf Hall of Fame. Under the principles of
Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n, the City could not legally allow the use of its
space for free, so that area should also be taken into consideration when determining the square
foot rate plaintiff would have been obligated to pay. That makes the total space used at 2,888
square feet, or $8.92 per square foot if the user fee were $25,750.
Each year, plaintiff was also allowed exclusive use of the golf course for two days
and was allowed to keep the green fees and 50 percent of the golf cart rentals for those days.
Plaintiff received an average of $5,532 per year over the course of the Office Use Agreement in
green fees and golf cart rentals, thereby effectively further lowering the user fee plaintiff paid.
Interrogatory Responses (Exhibit D), response to Interrogatory No. 7. Plaintiff believed that
these provisions allowing for the exclusive use of the golf course and retention of green fees and
golf cart rentals would continue in any twenty-year use agreement. Id, response to Interrogatory
No. 10.
When $5,500, therefore, is subtracted from the $25,750 user fee the Court ruled
plaintiff would have had to pay, the effective user fee is about $20,250 per year or $9.30 per
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square foot for 2,178 square feet and $7.01 per square feet for 2,888 square feet. The principles
of Sears9 Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n again demand that these green fees and golf
cart rentals fees be applied to reduce the user fee rate because these fees, absent the Second
Addendum, otherwise belong to the City.
Since plaintiff left the clubhouse, the City has leased 1,450 square feet of the
space plaintiff used, and the City has taken over the rest of the space. The City receives an
average of $12.17 per square foot for the space that is leased, and the renters are not allowed
exclusive use of the golf course or to keep green fees and golf cart rentals. Gardner Aff. ffl[ 3-4.
Thus, the amount plaintiff would have paid for a twenty-year use agreement would have been at
or below market rate for the office space.
The point is that plaintiff did not and would not have paid above a fair market
value for the use of the office space. Thus, there is consideration for the twenty-year use
agreement, yet the First Addendum and Second Addendum provided no additional consideration
for the Lot. Apparently, the Lot was just a gift thrown in—like the Hall of Fame space and green
fees—for plaintiff agreeing to office at the clubhouse. Because the City is prohibited by Utah
law from giving away its property for less than a "present benefit that reflects the fair market
value," the First Addendum and Second Addendum are ultra vires in that respect and cannot be
enforced. This is the result whether plaintiff would have executed a twenty-year use agreement
or not—the agreement to transfer the Lot or the proceeds from the sale of it was illegal. In other
words, plaintiff has no damages and its claim must be dismissed.
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C.

The Court's Prior Ruling Enlarges and Makes Clear the Agreement's
Violation of Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm'n.

The Court's prior ruling on plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment
enlarges and makes bare the violation of Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm *n created
by the parties agreement. Under the Second Addendum, plaintiff paid $25,000 per year for the
office space for six years, or about $150,000 total in user fees. Plaintiff, however, also received
and retained $33,192 in green fees and golf cart rentals over the life of the Office Use
Agreement. Interrogatory Responses (Exhibit D), response to Interrogatory No. 7. Thus,
plaintiff paid $116,808 net for the space over six years. As discussed above, this is likely below
market rate for the office space.
Now plaintiff wants the Court to order the City to pay it $190,000 just for the
value of the Lot. Interrogatory Responses (Exhibit D), response to Interrogatory No. 4 and
Exhibit F. (Plaintiff also claims other damages.) That is $73,192 more than the total amount
plaintiff paid out over the life of the Office Use Agreement for just the use of the space. Plaintiff
wants all of the money back that it paid, plus a nearly 63 percent return on the user fees it paid.
The City is left with nothing if the Court accepts plaintiffs reasoning. It has to
give back the money plaintiff paid for the six years plaintiff used the office space, plus a bunch
more. After the Court's ruling, the City does not even have the twenty-year use agreement
plaintiff was supposed to enter into to obtain the Lot, which would have brought in over $25,000
each year for twenty years, or more than $500,000. It means the City will have paid out $73,192
(plus possibly other damages plaintiff seeks) just for the privilege of having had plaintiff use the
6

City's office space for six years for free. The Court cannot condone this result because the City
is prohibited by Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n from leasing space at the
clubhouse for free. Yet, that is what would happen. If nothing else, this justifies reopening the
Court's ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment because of the loss to the City of the
twenty-year use agreement.
II.

THE COURT'S PRIOR RULING FAILED TO CONSIDER
CONTROLLING UTAH LAW.
The Court ruled that plaintiff was excused from entering into a twenty-year use

agreement with the City because the City did not have unrestricted title to the Lot. This finding,
however, was premature. In fact, the City could have delivered unrestricted title to the Lot.
Utah law is clear that a seller of real estate does not need to have unencumbered
title to the property at all times during the executory period of the contract. Neves v. Wright, 638
P.2d 1195, 1197-98 (Utah 1981). The seller is not required to have marketable title until the time
for conveyance arrives. Woodardv. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 222, 265 P.2d 398, 399 (1953). As
such, an anticipatory repudiation of an agreement to convey real estate cannot occur unless
defects in the title cannot be remedied by the seller. See Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123,
1125 (Utah 1984) ("encumbrances on appellants' title are irremediable").
The Utah Supreme Court in Neves stated that the "basic test" for determining
whether defects are irremediable is "whether the defect, by its nature, is one that can be removed,
as a practical matter, as distinguished from defects which, by their nature, cannot be removed by
the seller as a practical matter." Neves, 638 P.2d at 1199. Further, "[a] defect which, by its
7

nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter is one ; of such a nature that the
vendor neither has title "nor in a practical sense any prospect of acquiring it.'"" Id. (citations
omitted).
Neither party in this case attempted to determine whether the restrictions on the
Lot could be released. In fact, those restrictions could have been removed. Cannon Aff. ^[ 5-6.
The developer would have released the restrictions if the City agreed to exercise its right of first
refusal to purchase the Lot. Id. One might ask how this would change the outcome. It would
mean that the City could have delivered and plaintiff would have been required to enter into the
twenty-year use agreement to get the proceeds from the sale of the Lot. Further, plaintiff would
not be able to claim the huge windfall it now seeks.
An issue of fact exists whether, as a practical matter, the restrictions on the deed
could have been removed had plaintiff agreed to a twenty-year use agreement and the time for
conveyance arrived. The Court should, therefore, reconsider its ruling granting plaintiff partial
summary judgment on this issue, and it should find that this issue of whether a breach occurred
should go to trial.

8

LESTER A. PERRY (2571)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.. a Utah
non-profit corporation;
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

v.
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE.
UTAH, MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation,

Civil No. 000900561
Judae Timothv R. Hanson

Defendants

Plaintiff hereby responds to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents as follows.

appraise the building lot that should have been conveyed to the UGA. A copy of his appraisal is
attached.
The UGA may call Mr. Todd B. Jones of Bodell-Van Drimmelen, who appraised the lot for
the City in September, 1998, as a rebuttal witness.
INTERROGATORY NO 3: Identify all exhibits you intend to use at the trial of this matter.
RESPONSE NO. 3: See the accompanying list of Exhibits.
INTERROGATORY NO. *: State the amount of damages you claim and explain how you
calculate each element of damages.
RESPONSE NO. 4: All of the plaintiffs damages have not yet been determined. As of the
present date, the plaintiff has determined the following damages:
a.

The fair market value of the lot at the agreed upon size that should have been

transferred to the UGA. This value is set forth in the Christiansen appraisal.
b.

The cost of moving the UGA from its Eaglewood office to its present temporary

location. This cost is believed to be at least Si 1,903.44. The UGA will also need to move again
when a permanent location is available that will provide the UGA with a golf course location similar
to the Eaglewood offices for a time period similar to the remaining period left under the agreement
with North Salt Lake. Thus, at least another SI 1,903.44 will need to be expended to move into a
permanent golf course location. Attached hereto are the following bills for the move to temporary
space, $3,768.22 to Mesa Moving, $2,102.69 to Western Communications to move and reinstall the

telephone system. $1,217.00 for equipment and furniture and other items necessary to make the
temporary space useable as an office, and 54,815.53 for reprinting of envelopes and stationary. In
addition, the UGx\ had to direct the entire time and attention of several of its employees to moving
the offices for at least a two week period. These employees were Mr. Joe Watts, Mr. Jerry Marks,
and Ms. Toni Guest. Their salaries during this two week period were $2,308.00. $962.00, and
$481.00, respectively. Another two weeks will need to be spent by these same employees when the
UGA relocates into permanent offices.
c.

North Salt Lake's agreement also included space for the Utah Golf Association. Hall

of Fame. The UGA spent $4,500.00 for display areas for the Hall of Fame, which are useless at its
new location, Thanksgiving Point Golf Course. A similar amount of money will need to be spent
for new display cabnits.
d.

The written documents provide for payment of the UGA's court costs, expenses and

attorney's fees incurred in this action. These costs, fees and expenses will be provided to the Court
and North Salt Lake in an appropriate fee application. At the present time, they total over
$10,000.00.
INTERROGATORY NO 5: Please provide the current address of your offices, the number
of square feet you are leasing, the term of your current lease, and the amount you pay in rent on a
square foot basis and on an annual basis.
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RESPONSE NO 5: This information is irrelevant and not designed to lead to relevant
information because the UGA is not seeking any damages for the higher rent that the UGA will
ultimately pay for a permanent location. Notwithstanding, the UGA did not have a permanent office
site available to it on the short notice allowed by the City's three day notice to vacate. Thus, the
UGA had to move into a temporary site until a permanent golf course site can be negotiated. The
UGA is temporarily located ax 9125 South 150 West, Sandy, Utah. The leased property is
approximately 1300 square feet for which Plaintiff pays $1300 per month on a verbal lease.
INTERROGATORY NO 6:

Please state the different amounts you offered to pay

defendants to use the Eaglewood golf course clubhouse office space for twenty years, the dates you
made such offers and whether you claim the amounts offered represented fair market value or less
than or more than fair market value. Also state other proposed or expected terms of the use
agreement.
RESPOMSE NO 6- A number of rates were negotiated. Some were reduced to writing.
Attached hereto are the letters between the parties. Several of the UGA letters contain offers of lease
rates.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please state the amount of revenue obtained by plaintiff from
green fees and golf cart rentals for each day plaintiff had use of the Eaglewood golf course for its
own tournaments each year the March 31, 1992 Office Use Agreement was in effect and in 1999,
and break out each total into amounts received in green fees and golf cart rentals.
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RESPONSE NO. 7: The UGA objects to this interrogatory. It seeks information that is not
relevant and is not likely to lead to relevant information because the UGA is not seeking damages
for having to pay a higher lease rate for a permanent office at another golf course. Notwithstanding,
the following revenue was generated under the Eaglewood lease: 1994 - $6,000.00; 1995 $7,064.00; 1996 - $5,328.00; 1997 - $5,500.00; 1998 - $5,700.00; 1999 - $3,600.00. No revenue
was generated from the use of the driving range. The UGA received income of $500,00 per month
from the middle of 1995 until December 1999 for the sub-lease of the upstairs area.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please state the amount of revenue obtained by plaintiff for
each year the March 31, 1992 Office Use Agreement was in effect and in 1999, and break out each
total into amounts received in green fees and golf cart rentals.
RESPONSE NQ, 8: See response to interrogatory No. 7.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please state the amount of revenue you received each year the
March 31, 1992 Office Use Agreement was in effect and in 1999 from use of the Practice Driving
Range for plaintiffs Junior Golfers program.
RESPONSE NO. 9: See response to interrogatory No. 7.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State whether you understood any twenty-year use agreement
you would enter into the City would continue to include rights for you to the exclusive use of the
Eaglewood golf course for your own tournaments and the right to retain the green fees and/or part
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WOOD CRAPO LLC
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539
Larry S. Jenkins #4854
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 8412 1
(801) 366-6060
Kent L. Christiansen #4207
Christiansen & Christiansen
P.O. Box 11751
Salt Lake City, Utah 94147
(801)359-3762

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah nonprofit corporation,

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

AFFIDA VIT OF MARY WOOD CANNON

)

v.

)

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT
LAKE, UTAH, a Utah municipal
corporation; and THE CITY OF
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY, a Utah nonprofit
corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 000900561
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
:ss
)

MARY WOOD CANNON, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify concerning the matters set

forth herein. The matters set forth herein are based on my personal knowledge.
2.

I am a general partner in MRF Family Limited ("MRF'), which is the former

owner of the land on which much of the Eaglewood Golf Course and surrounding Eaglewood
subdivision in North Salt Lake City, Utah is presently situated.
3.

Prior to August, 1997, MRF was the owner of a parcel of real property (the

"MRF Parcel") that is situated adjacent to and northeast of the Eaglewood Golf Course club house.
4.

In August, 1997, MRF conveyed the MRF Parcel to the City by Special

Warranty Deed, which Special Warranty Deed contained restrictions on the use (the "Use
Restrictions") of the MRF Parcel.
5.

After the MRF Parcel was conveyed to the City by MRF neither the City nor

the Utah Golf Association approached MRF about the possibility of removing the Use Restrictions.
6.

Had the City or the Utah Golf Association approached MRF about removing

the Use Restrictions, MRF would have removed the Use Restrictions. I have been informed that the
First and Second Addenda to the Office Use Agreement each also contained a right of first refusal
for the THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY,
a Utah nonprofit corporation, (the "Building Authority") to purchase the MRF Parcel. MRF would
have removed the Use Restrictions contained in the Special Warranty Deed if the Building Authority
would have agreed to exercise its right of first refusal.

Further affiant sayeth naught.

a

DATED this

/(

day of January, 2001.

Mary WoodTCannon
Subscribed and sworn to before me a notary public this / '

Notary Public

i

W. SCOTT KJAR

1

563 West 500 South, #300
BounWui U»ahB4010
My Commission Expires
April 30 2002
State ol Utan
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WOOD CRAPO LLC
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539
Larry S. Jenkins #4854
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)366-6060
Kent L. Christiansen #4207
Christiansen & Christiansen
P.O.Box 11751
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
(SOI) 359-3762
Attorneys for Defendants
TN TEE THIRD JL'DICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOB. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah non-proiit corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

v.

)

THE CITY OF NORTH SALT
LAKE, UTAH, a Utah municipal
corporation; and THE CITY OF
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit
corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFWA YIT OF L, SCOTT GARDNER

Civil No. 000900561
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
)

COUNTY OP DAVIS

L. SCOTT GARDNER, being duly sworn, deposes and says;
1-

I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify concerning the matters set

forth herein. The matters set lorth herein are based on my personal knowledge,
2.

I am manager of the JEaglewcod golf couise, which is owned by The City

of North Salt Lake, Utah Municipal Building Authority, and operated by The City of Nonh Salt
Lake, Utah (the "City*1). One of my responsibilities is to manage the clubhouse at the golf
course.
3.

After plain tiff Utah Golf Association was evicted from the golf course

clubhouse in December, 1999. the City took over 1^38 square feet of the 2SS8 square feet
plaintiff had been using.
4.

The City also leased 1450 square feet of the space plaintiff had used 750

square feet was leased at Si0.00 per square foot and 700 square feet was leased at $14,50 per

square foot,
5.

Neither of the parties leasing space at the clubhouse has the right to

exclusive use of the golf course at any time, nor do they have the right to retain green fees or golf
can rentals for any day from the golf course.

2

Furthei affiant sayelii naught.
DATED this j ^ S a y of January, 2001.

L. Scott Gardner
Subscribed acd swom to before me a notary public this j ^ d a y of January, 2001,
L*ME H. DfLLJMGHAM
105 East 475 North

[SEAL] I

^
Z

My Commission Bipf.cs K / V ) T y ^ * / ~ 7
February 1.
2003
1.2DGS
r^-/wt.f>H* * J
STATE OF UTAH
Notary Public

S'\WF1MVA*LEA WNGWORTH SALT UUCtUflA^TODAVITOF SCOTT GAftD!S'£R,wp<i
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LESTER A. PERRY (2571)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah
non-profit corporation;
Plaintiff,

Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for
Summary Judgment

V

v•

Request for Hearing
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH. MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation,

Civil No. 000900561
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants

The plaintiff hereby opposes the motion of the defendants for reconsideration of the Court's
prior grant of summary judgment on liability and opposes the motion of the defendants for summary
judgment.
L

Introduction.

obligation to convey title to the lot, which they refused to do. See letters attached hereto as Exhibits.
The defendants then wrongfully terminated the lease and evicted the UGA in further breach of the
lease.
20.

Deny. The Addendums speak for themselves.

21.

Admit that the defendants did not have title to the lot at the time the Agreement and

the Addendums were executed, contrary to the express representations by the defendants in the
documents that the City of North Salt lake, Utah, Municipal Building Authority (the "Building
Authority" herein) owned the lot as "fee title owner." Admit that the City obtained the lot by special
warranty deed from the developer in 1997, a copy of which deed is attached to the memorandum of
the UGA in support of its prior summary judgment, which deed contains substantial restrictions as
to the use of the lot and does not convey "fee title" to the Building Authority. Allege that the deed
speaks for itself as to its terms and use restrictions.
22.

Object to the affidavit of Mary Wood Cannon because: 1) this lawsuit has progressed

to the point of final witness lists being exchanged and Ms. Cannon is not identified as a witness by
the City; 2) the City raises this defense, which is an affirmative defense, for the first time in Ms.
Cannon's affidavit, even though amendments of pleadings are no longer allowed in this case and
summary judgment on liability has previously been heard; and 3) Ms. Cannon has no foundation to
testify about speculation about what the developer would have done in 1999, contrary to the express

5

use restrictions contained within the developer's deed, and as such, the testimony violates the parol
evidence rule.
As demonstrated below, the testimony of Ms. Cannon is irrelevant to any material issue in
this case. To the extent that her testimony is relevant to the Court, request is hereby made pursuant
to Rule 56(f) for an opportunity to question the developer's officers who are also closely tied to the
City and the development of the Eaglewood area.
23.

See response to para. 22.

24.

Deny. The Minute Entry speaks for itself.

25.

Admit.

26.

Admit.

This testimony by North Salt Lake's employee, Mr. Scott Gardner,

demonstrates that the UGA's lease was valuable because it was for 2.178 square feet at $25,000.00
per year, which equates to $ 11.50 per square foot. Mr. Gardner admits that the fair rental value of
the premises is $14.50 per square foot. The UGA was wTongfully denied the opportunity to enjoy
the below market lease because of the defendants' wrongful termination of the lease and eviction of
the UGA. The difference of $3.00 per foot per year for the 20 year extended term is the measure of
the UGA's damages.
27.

Admit. This testimony of Mr. Gardner further supports the UGA's claim that it

enjoyed the benefits of a below market lease and has been further damaged by the defendants'
wrongful termination of the lease.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION INC.,
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NOTICE OF
SUMM JDMT, RELATED MATTERS
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
BENCH TRIAL

vs.

Case No: 000900561 CN

CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH
et al.,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

SUMM JDMT, RELATED MATTERS is scheduled.
Date: 04/16/2001
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N45
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE.
Date: 05/22/2001
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N45
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 05/29/2001
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N45
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 05/30/2001
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Date:
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BENCH TRIAL.
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Time: 10:00 a.m.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Summary judgment motion and motion for reconsideration are
scheduled as indicated herein.
No discovery completion date set until motions are decited.
The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not
be modified without court order, and then only upon a showing of
manifest injustice. Counsel are instructed to stay in contact with
the Clerk as the trial date approaches regarding dates.
Failure to appear at the Final Pretrial Conference may result in a
default.
At final pretrial, trial counsel and clients, or an individual with
authority to settle this case are to be present. Out of state
parties must be available by phone at the time of the final
pretrial.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah non-profit corporation;
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 000900561

vs.
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, a Utah municipal
corporation; and THE CITY OF
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY,
Utah non-profit corporation,
Defendants•

The Court has before it defendants1

Motion for Summary

Judgment and Reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 17#
2001. The Court also has before it in addition to the plaintifffs
Response to defendants' Motion, a Motion to Strike an Affidavit of
Mary Wood Cannon.

Those Motions were before the Court for oral

argument on April 16, 2001.

At that date and time, counsel for

both parties appeared and argued their respective positions.
During the course of the oral argument, the defendants asserted
that the Court should reconsider this matter and grant their Motion
for Summary Judgment, which would in effect dismiss the plaintiff's
Complaint on the basis that the Building Authority did not have the
legal right to convey title, thus making the contract upon which

UTAH GOLF V. CITY
OF NORTH SALT LAKE
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the plaintiff sues unenforceable.

MINUTE ENTRY
As that matter had not been

raised in the pleadings up to that point in time, the Court allowed
the plaintiff an opportunity to file a written Response.

The

defendants were given leave to file a Reply to that Response, and
then the matter would be decided.
The Court received the Reply to the plaintiff's Supplemental
Memorandum regarding Municipal Building Authority issues submitted
by the defendants on April 27, 2001.

Since the filing of that

final document, the Court has had an opportunity to review the
Supplemental Memorandum, re-review the documentation in support of
and in opposition to the defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment
and Reconsideration, as well as the documents submitted and the
arguments presented in connection with the Motion to Strike the
Cannon Affidavit.
Additionally, the Court has re-reviewed its decision entered
July 14, 2000, wherein the Court granted the plaintiff's Motion for
Partial

Summary

Judgment.

Finally,

the

Court

has

further

considered oral argument of counsel at the hearing on April 16,
2 001, and being fully advised, is satisfied that the plaintiff's
Motion to Strike must be granted for the reasons suggested by the
plaintiff in its moving papers, and that the defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration and Summary Judgment should be denied for the
reasons set forth by the defendants in both oral argument and in
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its responsive papers filed following the defendants1 Motion for
Reconsideration and Summary Judgment.
In addition to all of the foregoing, the Court observes and is
persuaded that while there is no such Motion under the Rules of
Civil Procedure that allow for a Motion for Reconsideration, that
this Court has inherent authority as long as it has jurisdiction
over a matter to reconsider an Order previously entered.

In other

words, if the Court becomes aware after entering a particular Order
that it was issued in error, based on something such as discovery
of a controlling

case directly on point from one of Utahfs

appellate courts, the trial Court ought not to have to stand on a
clear error by not revisiting the matter.
A Motion for Reconsideration, however, should and must be
limited.

In this case, the plaintiff brought its Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment seeking to resolve the issue of liability
as raised in its Complaint, leaving only for hearing the question
of damages sustained for breach of the agreement between the
plaintiff and the defendants. The defendants had ample opportunity
in responding to that Motion for Summary Judgment to raise the
issues they now raise as new items.

Clearly, the defendants1 now

raised position of there being inadequate consideration is an issue
that could have easily been raised in the original Motion for
Summary

Judgment

brought by the plaintiff.

The defendants'

UTAH GOLF V. CITY
OF NORTH SALT LAKE

PAGE 4

MINUTE ENTRY

position that the Court's decision in July of 2000, that the
defendants were unable to lift the restrictions on the lot to be
transferred was premature, could have also been raised at the
original Motion for Summary Judgment.

Finally, as to the Building

Authority's ability to transfer property, that again is an issue
that could have been raised at the original Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Defendants failed to raise those issues initially, and

should not now be permitted to continually raise new legal issues
in an attempt to avoid a previously granted Summary Judgment that
could have and should have been raised at the original Motion for
Summary Judgment. To the extent that a Motion for Reconsideration
exists at all, it does not exist for the purpose of raising new
legal arguments that were not raised in an original Motion.
For the foregoing reasons alone, the defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration should be denied, which would of course include the
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
The

Court

has,

however,

considered

the

merits

of

the

defendants' argument and is not persuaded that the legal arguments
asserted are such that a Motion for Summary Judgment would lie in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff even if it was
proper to reconsider the original granting of Summary Judgment to
the plaintiff.

The Court finds the plaintiff's positions and

UTAH GOLF V. CITY
OF NORTH SALT LAKE
responses

to
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defendants'

Motion
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for

Summary

Judgment

persuasive.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to reconsider
this matter.

Further, even if the Court were to accept

defendants' request to reconsider a previously granted

the

Summary

Judgment, the defendants are not entitled to Summary Judgment on
the basis of the materials submitted.
Counsel for the plaintiff should prepare an appropriate Order
showing that the Motion to Strike is granted, and showing that the
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and^the defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment are denied.
The Order should be submitted in §rfccordance with the Code of
Judicial Administration.
Dated this

/S~day of May, 2$rai.

?IMOTH^RX'*Hfttt,SON-'* '/
tolSTRICl£G£feCJUD£E

JUL I 9 2001
V"
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0eputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah non-profit corporation;
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 000900561

vs.
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, a Utah municipal
corporation; and THE CITY OP
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, i
Utah non-profit corporation,
Defendants•

This matter was before the Court for trial on May 30, 2001.
The parties were present through their authorized representatives
and represented by counsel. Counsel made opening statements, both
the plaintiff and the defendant offered evidence, and counsel made
closing arguments.

At the conclusion of closing arguments, the

Court took the matter under advisement.
Since taking this matter under advisement, the Court has
reviewed all the evidence offered and received, considered the
respective positions of the parties, and being fully advised,
enters the following Memorandum Decision.
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This is an action for breach of contract.

The issue of the

breach was resolved on plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment in accordance with this Courtfs Minute Entry of July 14,
2000. The defendant moved the Court to reconsider its granting of
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 17, 2001, and
that request for reconsideration was denied by this Court's Minute
Entry on May 15, 2001.
The issue before the Court at trial was the damages, if any,
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the defendants1 breach.
The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a series of
agreements for plaintiff to lease portions of a building to be
constructed on a new golf course being designed and built by the
defendant

in

development.

conjunction

with

a

surrounding

residential

Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 constitute the agreement.

In

relevant summary, the parties agreed that the plaintiff would lease
for five years, and at the end of that term would negotiate in good
faith for a more lengthy 20 year lease.
As an inducement to enter into the 2 0-year lease at the end of
the five-year lease, and fcr plaintiff locating its facility at the
golf course clubhouse, defendant agreed to provide a building lot
east of the clubhouse that would be approximately 18,975 square
feet.

The property in the agreements was not legally described,

but the evidence during the course of the trial shows that all
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parties understood that the lot would be located adjacent to the
east side of the clubhouse parking lot, fronting on a residential
road going into the developing subdivision.
As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties
started negotiations for a long-term lease.

It became clear that

the defendant did not hold title to the subject lot that would make
it marketable to third parties, because of restrictions in the deed
requiring that it be used for a golf Hall of Fame or as a golf
course. The City's deed provided that failure to use the property
for either one of those uses would cause it to revert to the City's
grantor.
The initial lease expired.
month tenant.

The plaintiff became a month-to-

The problems with the deed restrictions on the lot

could not be resolved. Plaintiff refused to enter into a long-term
lease without the defendant deeding the lot.
The defendant was agreeable to entering into a long-term lease
and continue to negotiate on the lot.

Eventually, the defendant

terminated the month-to-month tenancy with the plaintiff and served
a Notice to Quit, with an effective date of December 31, 1999.
Plaintiff relocated at the end of 1999, and this lawsuit followed.
The principal question before the Court is the value of the
lot the defendant was obligated to deliver.

The plaintiff also
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seeks damages consequential to its' relocating from the golf course.
Those relocation expenses include:
1.

Moving costs (past and future)

2.

Employee salaries during the moving period

3.

Telephone system relocation expenses

4.

Office stationery expenses, including other minor items

such as property left at the defendant's site when the plaintiff
moved, and some materials that could not be used in the new space
owned by the plaintiff.
As to the damages sought by plaintiff's relocation, the Court
finds that those were not reasonably incurred, or are speculative,
or constitute fixtures under the lease which became the defendant's
property when the plaintiff left.
The evidence clearly shows that the defendant's serving the
plaintiff with a Notice to Quit was the result of plaintiff's
refusal to discuss the terms of the 20 year lease and reserve the
lot issue for further resolution.

The plaintiff did not have to

move and incurred the expenses that it did, nor did the plaintiff
have to Lose the benefits it acquired at the defendant's golf
course. The plaintiff easily could have renegotiated the long-term
lease, and then pursued the lot issue, either through negotiations
or other legal evidence.

There is no indication that mutually

acceptable terms for a 20-year lease could not have been reached if
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the lot issue had been separately reserved. In the final analysis,
the plaintiff would have to pay rent for its activities at some
location, and in fact does, since this move.
Even though the defendant was not able to provide the lot
promised or other substitute compensation, the plaintiff had a duty
to reasonably mitigate its losses for the breach.

A reasonable

approach would have been to enter into satisfactory terms for a 20year lease and deal with the lot at a later time. As the plaintiff
has failed to reasonably mitigate its damages, it cannot now
recover the relocation expenses and other claimed consequential
damages related to its move.
In addition to the foregoing, the plaintifffs evidence on
costs

of

future moves are speculative

and do not meet

the

evidentiary threshold to show loss, even if failure to mitigate did
not apply.

The same is true with the claims of salaries paid

during a relocation period. Those were not shown to be exclusively
related to the move, and that those salaries would have been paid
in any event.

The items left behind to which the plaintiff seeks

damages, such as the television satellite dish became, under the
terms of the

lease, fixtures belong to the defendant.

The

plaintiff's claim that the current space does not allow use of
promotional materials is not related to the move, but rather the
size of the current rental space. Accordingly, on the items listed
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above, even had the plaintiff not failed to reasonably mitigate
damages, those items would not be recoverable.
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff's claim for damages
related to relocation following the Notice to Quit are denied.
Turning to the issue of the building lot, the Court notes that
the agreements between the parties provided that the defendant
will, as part of the 20-year lease agreement, provide plaintiff
with a lot east of the clubhouse parking area.

But for the

restrictions on the deed held by the defendant, the Court is
satisfied that a 20-year lease could have been negotiated.
The documents showing the agreement between the plaintiff and
the defendant provide, among other things as it relates to the lot,
that plaintiff may build on the lot or, if not, sell the lot,
giving the defendant a first right of refusal.
The plaintiff was entitled to a lot that would be marketable
to a third party.

The defendant cannot provide such a title, in

that the deed that it holds has restrictions that show that the
property reverts to tha grantor if the property is not used by the
plaintiff as a Hall of Fame or used as a golf course. Accordingly,
if the defendant transferred title to the plaintiff with the
current deed restrictions, the plaintiff could not sell the
property and realize the proceeds therefrom if it decided not to
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The plaintiff would lose a

significant benefit in the agreement struck between the parties.
The plaintiff asks for damages for the inability of the
defendant to produce a deed without the severe restrictions on the
lot promised.

The plaintiff is entitled to the value of what it

bargained for, that is, a lot that could be sold for its highest
and best use which, in the area where the lot is located, is
residential.
The Court determines the fair market value of the lot in
question at $158,441. The Court determines based on the evidence
received that $8.35 per square foot is an appropriate valuation of
the raw land, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a lot that
included 18,975 square feet.
Further, the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as
of the effective date of the Notice to Quit, to wit: the day
following the effective date of the Notice to Quit, that is,
January 1, 2000.
Concerning the issue of attorney's fees, the Court recalls
that the parties agreed that the Court would make a determination
of attorney's fees following a decision on the merits.

While the

plaintiff has not prevailed on all portions of its claim, it has
prevailed on the single most important issue, which is the lot.
Accordingly, the Court determines that the plaintiff is entitled
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under the terms of the contract to its reasonable attorney's fees
and costs.

In that regard, plaintiff's counsel may submit an

Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs, the amount of attorney's
fees must be noted by hourly rate# with proper foundation for
establishing the rate to be reasonable, together with an hourly
itemized

account of time spent relating to this case.

The

defendant will have ten days from the date of submission of the
attorney's fees and costs Affidavit to file an Objection if it so
chooses as to the amount of fees requested, not the entitlement.
Finally, plaintiff's counsel is to prepare a detailed set of
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.

The Court

expects that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will be
in-depth, and are not necessarily limited to the words of this
Memorandum Decision.

This Memorandum Decision is summary in

fashion and designed only to provide the parties with a summary
basis of the Court's determination. The Court will look forward to
the required Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment, and
Attorney's Fee Affidavit which, as indicated above, should all be
submitted in accordance with the Code of Judicial Administration.

Third Judioial District
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Utah non-profit corporation;
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY DECISION
AND ORDER
CASE NO. 000900561

vs.
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, a Utah municipal
corporation; and THE CITY OF
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH,
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, \
Utah non-profit corporation,
Defendants.

The Court has before it a request for decision seeking a
decision on the defendants1 objections to Plaintiff's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the defendants
Objections to plaintiff's requested attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and court costs.
The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers on
both issues and being fully advised, enters the following Minute
Entry decision and Order.
The Court overrules the Objections to the proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Court is satisfied that they

adequateLy reflect the determinations of the Court as contained in
the Court's Minute Entry decision of July 19, 2001. The Court has
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the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law in the form presented by counsel for the
plaintiff.
As to the Objections to the requested attorneyfs fees and
costs, the Court determines that the requested fees are excessive
in part.
The plaintiff is entitled to fees for all matters relating to
the issue of liability as determined by the first Summary Judgment,
and also fees in responding to the Motion for Reconsideration. The
plaintiff is entitled to fees for the preparation for trial as it
relates to the value of the property only, and the trial time and
post-trial time related to the value of the property.

Any time

that has been spent by plaintiff's counsel dealing with the claimed
damages that were disallowed, either in preparation for trial or at
the time of trial, would be inappropriate.
Accordingly, counsel for the plaintiff is to review the work
performed and provide a further document showing how the fees have
been calculated as it relates to the issue of liability, the Motion
to Reconsider, and the trial and post-trial matters relating to
value of the property only.

The Court cannot tell from the

plaintiff's

defendants1

response

to

the

Objection

regarding

attorney's fees if the items listed there are the only items that
should be reduced.

Once those items have been /moved from the
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fees, the Court will grant the remaining

fees as

plaintiff's reasonable and necessary attorneyfs fees in this
matter.
As to the defendants1 Objections to costs for the security
bond and the defendants1 Objections to the expert valuations costs
that were not admitted into evidence, the Court finds those to be
improperly included on litigation expenses or court costs, and
those items should be deleted from the plaintiff's court costs
and/or litigation expenses.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court returns the original
Judgment

to counsel for the plaintiff

and after appropriate

calculations have been made, the Court will enter a Judgment
setting forth the attorney's fees, litigation expenses and court
costs.

The fees, litigation expenses and court costs should be

dealt with in separate paragraphs so it is clear what is being
sought and the amount being awarded.
Once the Judgment has been redone in accordance with the
Court's instructions contained herein, they should be submitted to
the Court for review and signature.
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As to the defendants' Objections to fees, costs and Findings,
this Minute Entry will stand as the/Court's Order in relation
thereto.

No further Order is required.

Dated this lt> dav of October, 2001.

?IM0THY R. HANSON ,, ,,
' DISTRICT COURT^JUDGE J' o» .

JbmoU
l^y

F1L1D DISTRICT COURT
ThW Judicial District
LESTER A. PERRY (2571)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah
non-profit corporation;

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law

Plaintiff,

v.
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation.

Civil No. 000900561
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants

Having decided the issue of the existence of a contract between the parties and the
defendants' breach of the contract on summary judgment in its minute entry of July 14,2000, which
minute entry was incorporated in the Partial Summary Judgment entered on August 7, 2000; having
declined to grant the defendants' motion for reconsideration and the defendants' summary judgment

in its minute entry of May 15, 2001; and having conducted a bench trial on the issue of damages on
May 30, 2001; the Court makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Findings of Fact
1.

The plaintiff, the Utah Golf Association (referred to herein as the "UGA") is an

organization representing amateur golf in the state of Utah.
2.

The defendant, the City of North Salt Lake, Utah (referred to herein as "North Salt

Lake"), is a municipal corporation.
3.

The defendant, the City of North Salt Lake, Utah, Municipal Building Authority, is

a municipal building authority created by North Salt Lake.
4.

The defendants constructed a new golf course, called Eaglewood Golf Course, and

a club house.
5.

On or about March 31, 1992, the parties entered into an agreement entitled "Office

Use Agreement" (referred to herein as the "Agreement").
6.

The Agreement executed by the parties included a "First Addendum to Office Use

Agreement" (referred to herein as the "First Addendum").
7.

On or about January 3,1994, the parties executed a "Second Addendum to Office Use

Agreement (referred to herein as the "Second Addendum").
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8.

The parties agreed within the Agreement, First Addendum and Second Addendum

that the UGA would lease its offices at the club house from North Salt Lake for a term of five years,
and at the end of that term would negotiate in good faith for a 20 year lease.
9.

As an inducement for the UGA relocating its offices and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame

to the club house; as an inducement to entering into the agreements; and as an inducement to enter
into a 20 year lease extension; North Salt Lake agreed to convey fee title to the UGA in an 18,975
square foot building lot that was just east of the club house parking lot. fronting on a residential
street leading into the adjacent, developing subdivision.
10.

As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties started negotiations for a long-

term lease.
11.

The UGA desired to exercise its rights under the First Addendum and enter into a 20

year lease. However, the UGA required the City to obtain release of the use restrictions in the deed
and stand ready to deed "fee title" in the building lot to the UGA that could be marketable to third
parties.
12.

During these negotiations, it became clear that North Salt Lake did not hold title to

the subject lot that would make it marketable to third parties because of use restrictions in the deed
that North Salt Lake received from the original developer.
13.

Between March, 1999 and December, 1999, the parties tried to resolve the problem

caused by the use restrictions on the lot.

3

14.

The defendants did not obtain release of the use restrictions on the lot.

15.

The initial lease expired and the UGA became a month-to-month tenant.

16.

North Salt Lake was agreeable to entering into a long-term lease and continue to

negotiate on the lot. The UGA required North Salt Lake to be able to convey the lot free and clear
from the use restrictions before entering into a new lease.
17.

But for the use restrictions on the lot, the parties would have successfully negotiated

a 20-year lease.
18.

North Salt Lake terminated the month-to-month tenancy of the UGA and evicted the

UGA from its offices on December 31, 1999.
19.

The UGA complied with the eviction notice and vacated its offices at the Eaglewood

golf course.
20.

The UGA incurred costs in moving its offices, salaries for employees involved with

the move, expenses associated with relocating its telephone system, costs of new stationary with a
new address, and miscellaneous expenses associated with the move, primanly the cost of items that
had to be left at the club house or could not be used at the UGA's new site.
21.

The value of the lot, if it did not have the use restrictions, was $158,441.00 on the

effective date of the eviction, January 1, 2000.

4

Conclusions of Law
1.

The defendants breached the lease by not being able to convey unrestricted, fee title

to the lot that could be marketed to third parties.
2.

The costs incurred in moving the UGA offices were not reasonably incurred, wrere

speculative, or were caused by the failure of the UGA to mitigate its damages.
3.

The items left at the club house by the UGA were fixtures under the lease and became

the property of North Salt Lake when the UGA moved out.
4.

The UGA was damaged by not being able to obtain what it bargained for, the value

of the lot at its highest and best use, which was residential, without any use restrictions.
5.

The UGA prevailed on the single, most important issue in this case, which was breach

of the lease by the defendants and the loss of the value of the lot because of the breach.
6.

The UGA is entitled to its attorney's fees that were reasonably incurred in this action

and to its court costs.

*
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IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah
non-profit corporation;

Judgment

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 000900561
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE.
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE,
UTAH, MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation,
Defendants

The Court having entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, hereby enters this
judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, as follows:
1.

For $158,441.00;

2.

For prejudgment interest thereon at 10 % per annum from January 1, 2000 through

the date of this judgment;
3.

For attorney's fees and litigation expenses of $20,974.00.

4.

For court costs of $204.00 and litigation expenses of $516.31, totaling $720.31;

5.

For post judgment interest on the total money judgment of $180,135.31 at 7.34% per

annum.
Df-6etobcT
:
DATED this / j day of
•October, ;2001.
BY THE COURT:

r -

,.

v.

imothv R. Hanson^ '* "«-•
District Judge
^ ^ '-aca»,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment,
in Civil No. 000900561, postage prepaid, thisJ&T day of October, 2001 to:
Larry S. Jenkins
WOODCRAPO
60 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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1 j everything that it paid out under the agreement.
2

I would like to mention one other issue on this part

3

of our motion, your Honor.

I guess it's one of those you

4

could — I guess you should call it a forest-for-the-trees

5

issue.

6

contracts are set up, it recites that the Building Authority

As I was preparing for argument, I noted the way the

7 I was the party that held title to this lot, and of course there
8

was some problem with that representation, as the Court found

9

last year.

It also provides —

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. JENKINS:

Well, it's true.
It is true.

It is true.

12 J saying this is the way the agreement is written.
13

I'm just
But the way

the agreement was also written is the Building Authority was to

14 j be the one to transfer the lot, or was to sell the lot and give
15

the proceeds, I guess, to the UGA.

But under the Municipal

16 j Building Authority Act, a building authority is only empowered j
17

to acquire, improve, or extend one or more projects and finance '

18

their cost on behalf of the public body.

19

to enter into leasing contracts with the public body that

20

created them.

21

for a municipal building authority to dispose of property, by

22

sale or otherwise, to anyone other than the public body that

23

created it.

24

contract.

25

They're entitled also'

But nowhere in the act is there any authority

i

j

And that is generally pursuant to a leasing

So I guess the point is, not only was this
11

1 I transaction ultra vires in that there was no consideration
2

contemplated at all for this building lot, but the Building

3

Authority had no authority to transfer the property to anyone

4

other than the city, and then only pursuant to a leasing

5

contract, according to the Municipal Building Authority Act,

6 I

THE COURT:

So if you deal with some governmental

7 I agency that claims to have authority and agrees to do things
that it cannot legally do, you do so at your own risk?
9 |
10

MR. JENKINS:
Honor.

11

I think to some extent you do, your

I think you need to THE COURT:

Why does that strike me as inordinately

12 I unfair?

I

I

13

MR. JENKINS:

Well - and I can understand your point, |
i

14 I your Honor, but I think here, where you have a situation where I
15

the agreement is entirely lopsided on UGA's side, you have a

16

situation where the only thing they're paying for is office

17

space.

18

they're getting all of these other things, including transfer

|

They're paying rent on office space, and yet supposedly

19 I of what they claim to be a $190,000 building lot.
20

I understand the city entered into that — or, you

21

know, signed that agreement, but at the same time the city is

22

charged with protecting the interests and the property that

23

belongs to it on behalf of the people.

24

in trust. And if the city, after something is done as far as a

That property is held

25 I contract or otherwise that suggests that that is not a
12

1 i governing the parties, the issue of the defect on the title may
2 t be irrelevant, and probably shouldn't be the determining factor
3

in this case on whether there was an anticipatory repudiation.

4

Let me go through what the course of negotiations

5 | were, and perhaps the Court will understand my point.

First of

6 J all, in the agreement the Building Authority, of course, was
7

the party that — it said in there was the party that held the

8

property, and it was the one that was going to transfer the

9

property.

The Building Authority also reserved a right of

10 I first refusal to purchase the property should a sale occur such
11
12
13

that the proceeds go to the UGA.
Now, all of the negotiations that preceded the
December 8th, 1999 letter that UGA relies upon shows that the

14 j parties were actually trying to negotiate the price of the lot
15

into the deal.

In fact, that went on for several months.

It

16 j was raised early on, and there are a few attempts throughout
17

the summer and into September in 1999 to actually negotiate the

18

value of the lot into the deal.

19

On December 7th, 1999, after several months of no

20

communications between the parties, the city council decided to

21

sever negotiations.

22

their December 8th letter the very next day, after there hadn't

23

been communications for a few months, offering a different

24

deal, a significant price increase, but also demanding the lot

25

be transferred to it free and clear.

Now, mysteriously, the UGA then sends

21

1 J

I recognize that there were some discussions earlier

2

about the restrictions being taken off the deed then, but there

3

was no discussion in the Deceimoer 8th letter about the prior

4

negotiations that had gone where the value of the lot was

5

essentially being considered and negotiated as part of the

6

deal.

It appears to me that the UGA probably was aware of the

7 I city council's decision the night before and probably wanted to
8 J do something to try and improve its position*
9
10

But before receiving the December 8th letter, and
without referencing it, the city attorney then sent the

11 | December 9th letter from the city canceling negotiations.

Now,

12

it seems to me, given the course of negotiations and the facts

13

underlying those, that a question of fact exists whether an

14

encumbrance could have been a repudiation, or whether or not it

15 j was even irremediable, or I think whether it was relevant.
16

I think the question is further heightened by the

17

fact that the lot was, as I indicated earlier, supposedly held

18

and was to be conveyed by the Building Authority.

19

Authority by statute could only sell the lot to the city.

20

Where the city was the only possible buyer, and where the

21

Building Authority had a right of first refusal, I think the

22

fact that there was a defect in the title becomes much less

23

significant, particularly where all along the city was trying

24

to negotiate the price of the lot into the deal all along.

The Building

And

25 I so I think that really places an issue of fact as to where the
22
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1
MR. PERRY: I must admit that there is no testimony
2 that says I had to give up handling this golf tournament or I
3 had to give up handling this sales campaign for new members.
4 You're correct. I must say that. The only testimony that
5 exists is that they spent their time, pretty much full time for
6 this two week period and that's what they were paid.
7
THE COURT: All right.
8
MR. PERRY: We have a television dish that the UGA
9 paid half of that the UGA didnt cause a problem, say we want
10 that dish. They simply left but they lost their half of the
11 dish for $1,140. They just left it up to Eaglewood. There was
12 a counter and a door very similar to what's around the court
13 here that was specially made for the specific dimensions of the
14 UGA property that cant be used. It's in storage and they paid
15 $1,029 for that counter.
16
The Hall of Fame has a central display cabinet. It
17 was a walk around cabinet, very large. It has special glass
18 windows all around it. It houses some of the better
19 memorabilia of Utah golf and that cabinet was built for the
20 specific area at the Eaglewood area which is large enough to
21 have you walk around the area. It cannot be used and is not
22 being used at the present site, and the cost of that was
23 $4,965. These were the initial damages that were incurred
24 because of the move.
25
There is one other thing that is going to have to
137

1
MR. JENKINS: Your Honor, in a case like this where a
2 party is claiming a breach of contract, the typical standard of
3 recovery of damage is the benefit of the bargain. And as I
4 understand the benefit of the bargain as the value of what the
5 contract was going to bring to the non-breaching party, less
6 what they were supposed to pay, less again expenses that are
7 avoided by not having to perform.
8
In this case, the UGA has asked for the full value of
9 the lot which Mr. Perry now states is about $158,000 based on
10 the size of the lot, and by implication, because he didn't
11 state what the UGA was supposed to pay for that lot, I assume
12 that means he thinks the UGA was suppose to get it without
13 paying anything which I think supports the argument we made
14 previously in the motion for summary judgment, that there was
15 no consideration contemplated for this lot. But beside that,
16 you also have to look at the expenses that are avoided, the
17 costs that are avoided by not having to perform, essentially
18 looking at what would the parties have had to pay out had they
19 gone ahead and completed the agreement as contemplated.
20
In this case, the UGA was supposed to have entered
21 into a 20 year lease, that's a cost that they've avoided. They
22 dont have to do that now or they haven't done that with the
23 city and the Court has ruled that, of course, that was a
24 condition that was excused, but I think in calculating damages,
251 think the Court still needs to take that into account.
139

1 happen. The UGA is in a place that is about 60 percent the
2 size of where it was and what it needs and it is in a non-golf
3 course location. It prefers the golf course location. It
4 could not find an appropriate place at the time within the
5 three days that it had to move. There are two particular
6 damages that are going to have to be repeated, particularly the
7 moving expense and the telephone. It's going to be a very
8 similar cost to move themfromthe place they're in now. It's
9 the same amount offtirniture,the same amount of documents,
10 stationary, and movefromwhere it is now out to another golf
11 course location. It's going to be very similar to tear down
12 the same telephone system out of its present place, move it
13 into the new place. And in likelihood, the same amount of time
14 is going to have to be spent by the UGA employees in handling
15 this move. The UGA would ask this Court to reimburse it for
16 these costs, these expenses of the move.
17
Your Honor, these costs and expenses were incurred in
18 December of'99, the middle part of December of'99 and we
19 believe that prejudgment interest should be added to the cost
20 and expenses that are ultimately awarded by the Court. The
21 only other item is attorney's fees which we discussed. Well
22 wait and see who is the prevailing party and (inaudible).
23
Thank you, Your Honor.
24
THE COURT: Thank you.
25
Mr. Jenkins?
138

1
The testimony today has shown that right now UGA is
2 paying a little less than, about $14,400 a year which is more
3 than $10,000 less than what they were paying at the clubhouse,
4 suggesting that they have avoided at least that much over the
5 last year and a half and possibly into the future. We dont
6 know exactly where that's going to play out. They've certainly
7 avoided those costs and I think that needs to be taken into
8 consideration in placing a value on what it is that the UGA is
9 entitled to for damages.
10
I thinks some other things need to be taken into
11 account as well. Mr. Perry adjusts the VanGremlin appraisal
12 upward because of the size of the lot that was contemplated way
13 back in 1992, but as the evidence has shown today, way back in
14 1992 this was raw ground. There were no roads involved or
15 anything like that and it was contemplated, it was important to
16 Mr. Watts that there be a road in front of where the lot went.
17 Typically as I understand real estate law if you've got raw
18 land and you've got a lot, if you put a road through it and
19 dedicate that to the city, sometimes that chops off the front
20 of the lot and that may compensate for the area that that was
21 missing, the difference between the 18,975 feet and the 17,768
22 feet.
23
THE COURT: Does that appraisal say this?
24
MR. JENKINS: Pardon?
25
THE COURT: Does the appraisal say that?
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August 23. 1999
Mayor Jim Dixon
North Salt Lake City Offices
North Salt Lake, Utah
Dear Mayor Dixon:
At our meeting last week you suggested that it might be helpful to the negotiating process
if the UGA would suggest the terms of a lease agreement that would be acceptable to us.
and that we could work from that point. You suggested that we should consider including
the price of the lot into the monthly lease payments.
With that in mind we would propose a lease of S16.000 per year for ten years plus two
days of use of the golf course each year. This proposal includes the purchase of the lot.
We arrive at this figure based on the current lease rate of S25.000 per year, plus a 3%
increase each year for the extended term, plus S80.000 for the lot, plus a 10% interest per
annum.
We are suggesting a reduced length in the lease because it is probably in both of our
interests.
Please get back to us as soon as possible.

Visit the UGA website...

www.uga.org

CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE
20South Hwy.89 P.O.Box 540208
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054-0208
(801)298-3877

September 8, 1999

Douglas A. Baxter
President
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604-4438

JAMES W. DIXON
Miyor

COLLLNH.WOOP
City Manner

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
//

RE: Utah Calf Association Lease
Dear Mr, Baxter;
I have reviewed your proposal dated August 23, 1999 with the North Salt Lake City
Council. The City Council has requested that I convey a counteroffer relative to a new lease
with the Utah Golf Association at the Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse.
The City would propose to lease to the UGA approximately 2,178 square feet of office
space at the Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse at the initial annual rate of 330,000.00, with
annual increases in rent of 3% for a term of twenty (20) years. The City Council is also willing
to include as pan of the lease arrangement, the right of the UGA to use the Eaglewood Golf
Course for two (2) Monday mornings each year for the purpose of conducting their own
tournament.
In addition, upon executing the twenty (20) year lease, the City would agree to acquire
the resulting interest the UGA would have in the subject lot adjacent to the clubhouse for the
value 5100,000.00. The 5100,000.00 would be paid over the period of the twenty (20) year
lease via a rent reduction of 55,000.00 per year. No interest would accrue on the acquisition
price of the subject lot.
The UGA's lease at Eaglewood expired about eight months ago. The City would like
to continue to have the association with the UGA at the golf course, an association which has
been positive for the past five plus years. It is, however, critical for the parties to resolve the
future of the lease at the club house. The City Council has requested that the UGA respond to
the above counterproposal no later than October 1, 1999. The above counteroffer is to be
considered a final offer. In the event that wc are unable to reach an agreement as to the
substantive terms of the lease by October 1, 1999, the City will need to know of the UGA's
intentions concerning construction of a building on the premises, and/or the UGA's relocation.

Douglas A. Baxter
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION
Septembers, 1999
Page 2
We appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and Joe Watts, and your efforts to
resolve this issue. The City is hopeful that we may expeditiously finalize the matter and that
the parties may continue their association at the North Salt Lake Eaglewood Golf Course.

S&LT LAKE
hristiansen]
KLC/moc
cc:
Mayor James Dixon
City Counciimembers
Collin Wood
Scott Gardner

April 10, 1999
(This is a personal communication from Joe Watts to Scon Gardner. It she J d be made
clear that Joe Watts does not have the authority to enter into any binding agreements on
this matter and that his thoughts and suggestions are just an attempt to get the lease
negotiations between the two parties off of dead center Joe Watts musfget board
approval before entering into any agreements. These comments are his personal thoughts
and are not necessarily reflective of the UGA board position.)
Dear Scott:
We were sought out. invited, and encouraged to move to Eaglewood Golf Course by the
developers and North Salt Lake City. It was a joint effort by Steve Smoot. Jake Simmons,
and Colin Wood. The UGA was also being courted with an attractive offer from SLC to
join with them in the new office building at Forest Dale.
In order to secure our presence and add credibility to their project North Salt Lake made a
very attractive offer to us. Many of the specific terms of the agreement were made by
North Salt Lake to ^induce" us to enter into the agreement.
In addition to below market rental space and some free space for the Hall of Fame, North
Salt Lake offered to give the UGA a warranty deed to an adjacent piece of property. A
special clause of the agreement makes it very clear that the UGA had the option to sell
the property and retain the proceeds from the sale. The agreement mentions several
specific restrictions, but does not mention that the UGA would have to get permission
from anyone else to sell the property, or that we would have to share the proceeds with
any other party.
Similar properties have sold at $165,000. The appraisal commissioned by North Salt
Lake places a value of 5150,000 on the lot.
We have met the terms of our agreement and feel that North Salt Lake is obligated to
give us the warranty deed so that we can resell the property and retain all the proceeds.
When we find a buyer North Salt Lake has first right of refusal.
The restrictive clause that has been put on the property by an agreement between the
developer and the city was not approved by the UGA, was added after North Salt Lake
had entered in the agreement with the UGA, and in fact, the UGA had no knowledge that
such an agreement existed between the city and the developer until just a few months
ago.
As to the particulars of the lease agreement it is clear that North Salt Lake wanted our
agreement to be long term. North Salt Lake offered the UGA the choice of building an
office building, or reselling the property and remaining as a tenant for 20 years. When the
two parties signed the original agreement the terms of the extended 20-year lease were
considered. North Salt Lake wanted to protect itself against the possibilities of inflation

and so the UGA agreed to accept a three- percent annual increase for the extended term
of the lease. Otherwise there were to be no changes in the extended lease agreement. The
UGA would not have entered into an agreement that imposed exorbitant increases in an
extended term of the lease. The intent was clear that the UGA would continue to receive
similar lease considerations.
The UGA has already indicated to North Salt Lake an intent to exercise its option to
resell the property, and as the previous agreement requires, the UGA is also willing to
sign a 20-year lease with a three percent annual increase for the next 20 years.
If North Salt Lake would like to purchase the property from the UGA at this point in time
I think I can persuade the UGA Board to accept 50% of its appraised value. The
appraised value, as determined by the city's appraisal is SI50,000, which makes the
selling price just $75,000 to the city.
If the city does not want to buy it at this time it will present the city, the developer, and
the UGA with a question of how to deal with the restrictive agreement currently clouding
the deed to the property. The restrictive agreement between Nonh Salt Lake and the
developer is a moot point if the city decides to purchase the property from the UGA. We
would like to keep it a moot point and so we encourage the city to purchase the property
now rather than wait for a first right of refusal later, which in all likelihood will be
considerably higher than the $75,000. One of the reasons I suggest such a big discount on
the property is to help all the parties avoid the necessity of facing the restrictive deed
dilemma.
You and I need to work this out in such a way that there are no hard feelings between the
UGA and Nonh Salt Lake. I'm hoping that we can cut through the posturing, and that the
two of us can quickly come to a win-win agreement.
Thanks,

Jo-

